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Abstract 
This essay challenges the received idea that Ibn al-Muqaffa‘, the 8th-century Arabic 
translator of the Kalīla-Dimna fables, added the Trial of Dimna, the sequel to the first 
story of the Lion and the Bull, in order to let morality win in the end. The analysis of 
this sequel’s synopsis shows the absence of morality and how the ruler uses the 
judicial to manipulate public opinion and to redress his politically-damaged image. 
The essay also shows that the sequel’s main purpose and use is to give a practical 
demonstration of the art of forensic rhetoric, casting Dimna as a pre-eminent and 
redoubtable sophist. The Anvār-i Suhaylī version, the 15th-century Persian rewriting 
by Vā’iz Kāshifī, on which the essay is based, also engages with the philosophical 
conundrum of tasdīq, which seems absent in the Arabic versions of the text.  
 
The meaning of the text known as Kalīla and Dimna (KD) in the Arabic and Persian 
literary worlds has been deprived of the academic regard its gravitas deserves. I 
conjecture that this is due to bafflement stemming from a fundamental 
misinterpretation of the work’s contents, coupled to discouragement at the results of 
the textual-heredity focus of KD research over the last two centuries. Indeed, one now 
views with diffidence the nineteenth and first half of the twentieth-century’s arduous 
and distinguished line of philological attempts at recreating an Ur-text and editio 
                                                 
1
 My research on the Kalīla and Dimna and on its fifteenth-century version Anvār-i Suhaylī began 
during my 2007 sabbatical term as Fellow in Residence at the Columbia University Institute for 
Scholars, Reid Hall in Paris. I hereby would like to thank the Institute for their invaluable help. A 
preliminary and much abridged version of this research was presented at the Wright Lectures and 
Graduate Seminar at FAMES, University of Cambridge UK in October 2012. It has benefited from the 
constructive feedback and remarks made by generous colleagues and research students on this 
occasion. This topic will also be part of my forthcoming monograph on Anvār-i Suhaylī. 
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princeps in Sanskrit, Syriac and Arabic.
2
 Present-day awareness of the value of 
misreadings makes it possible to approach successive rewriters’ additions and 
interpretations in a positive fashion, as indications of their informed attempts at 
clarifying the stories’ meaning and style, or at capitalising on some specific aspects in 
the stories. This attitude is presumably as legitimate and perhaps more constructive 
than viewing their efforts as corruptions taking us yet one step further away from 
adherence to an elusive Ur-version.
3
 Also, by the first half of the twentieth century, 
this prevailing narrowness of focus of the KD-field combined to its sweeping 
linguistic scope, reached a pitch of complexity such, that it discouraged further work 
in this direction and the impetus was brought to a grinding halt.
4
 Fortunately, the 
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 The pioneering and key studies for the Sanskrit and Syriac versions are: Th. Benfey (ed./tr.), 
Pantschatantra. Fünf Bücher indischer Fabeln, Märchen und Erzählungen, 2 vols (Leipzig, 1859); G. 
Bickel (ed./tr.), Kalilag und Damnag. Alte Syrische Übersetzung des Indischen Fürstenspiegels, mit 
einer Einleitung von Theodor Benfey (Leipzig, 1876); F. Edgerton (ed./tr.), The Panchatantra 
Reconstructed, Text, Critical Apparatus, Introduction, Translation, vol. II: Introduction and 
Translation (New Haven, 1924); J. Hertel (ed./tr.), Tantrakhyayika. Die Älteste Fassung des 
Pancatantra (Leipzig, Berlin, 1909); F. Schulthess, Kalila und Dimna. Syrisch und Deutsch (Berlin, 
1911). There is to date no reconstructed Ur-version of the Arabic Ibn al-Muqaffa’ text and the existing 
editions vary significantly: this is already noted by Th. Benfey in his remark in the Introduction to the 
Old Syriac Version, (Bickel (1876), p. xi). Also Th. Nöldeke, “Zu Kalila wa Dimna,” Zeitschrift der 
Deutsche Morgenländische Gesellschaft, LIX (1905), p. 794; A. J. Arberry, Classical Persian 
Literature (1958, reprint Richmond, 1994), p. 95; A. Miquel, Ibn al-Muqaffa’, Le Livre de Kalila et 
Dimna traduit de l’arabe par André Miquel (1957, reprint  Paris, 1980), pp. viii-ix; F. de Blois, 
Borzuy’s Voyage to India and the Origin of the Book of Kalilah wa Dimnah, Royal Asiatic Society 
(London, 1990), p. 3. See for an example of the efforts to reconstruct what the original Ibn al-Muqaffa’ 
version must have looked like, W. Norman Brown, “A Comparative Translation of the Arabic Kalila 
wa-Dimna, Chapter VI”, Journal of the American Oriental Society (1922), pp. 215-250. As is the case 
with the Pancatantra text, the question of the legitimacy – and the ultimate value – of such painstaking 
reconstructions of a putative Ur-text, is moot.  
3
 As advocated in H. Bloom, The Anxiety of Influence: A Theory of Poetry (London, New York, 1973) 
and H. Bloom, A Map of Misreading (Oxford, 1975).  
4
 In a desperate appeal in 1924 to scholars across linguistic, cultural and chronological divides to unite 
in what Nöldeke termed a kolossales Unternehmen, Sprengling hoped that by collating all known 
versions, the original ancestor and the line of heredity would finally be fixed. Sprengling’s call was not 
heard: M. Sprengling, “Kalīla Studies. 1”, The American Journal of Semitic Languages and 
Literatures, 40/2 (1924), pp. 81-97. (stable URL http://www.jstor.org/stable/528170 accessed 
02/11/2011). See my view on the state of the question in C. van Ruymbeke, “Murder in the Forest. 
3 
disenchantment only concerns the academic focus on the text’s heredity and Ur-
version across centuries, cultures, religions and languages. The text’s meaning and 
content have kept their bloom, left almost untouched, and their thoughtful 
consideration gives giving us the rare pleasure of stepping into the fresh fragrant 
clover fields of a terra quasi incognita.  
 
This neglect for, or misunderstanding of, their scope and intent has resulted in global, 
summary descriptions of the fables as amusing stories belonging to the realm of 
popular (thus simplistic and often illogical) literature. This attitude seems to be 
present almost from the inception of Arabic literary criticism, with our acceptance of 
Ibn al-Nadīm’s (d. 995 AD) classification of KD under the heading of “night-time 
stories and fables (al-asmār wa al-khurafāt)”.5 This particular class of books is then 
generally – I suggest, too hastily - understood as the category of sleep-inducing 
entertainment. When mention is made of the text’s traditional reputation as a Mirror 
for Princes (MfP), this is but puzzled lip-service.
6
  
                                                                                                                                            
Celebrating Rewritings and Misreadings of the Kalila-Dimna tale of the Lion and the Hare”, Studia 
Iranica, 41 (2012), pp. 203-254. D. Riedel differentiates between the search for the Ur-version, and the 
effort to produce synthetic versions in the relevant linguistic traditions. (D. Riedel, “Kalila and Demna. 
i. Redactions and Circulations”, Encyclopaedia Iranica online, Vol. XV, Fasc. 4, (2010), pp. 386-395).  
5
 Ibn al-Nadīm, Kitab al Fihrist, translated Bayard Dodge, 2 vols. (New York, 1970), vol.ii, p. 712. I 
am aware of the debate around the traditional designation of the stories as “fables”. For expediency’s 
sake, I will however continue to use this designation indifferently with that of ‘stories’. See R. Forster, 
“Fabel und Exempel, Sprichwort und Gnome. Das Prozesskapitel von “Kalīla wa-Dimna”,” in 
Tradition des Proverbes et des exempla dans l’Occident Médieval, Colloque Fribourgeois 2007, (eds) 
H. O. Bizzarri e.a. (Berlin-New York, 2009), pp. 191-218. Forster attempts a classification of the 
hikāyats and sententiae found in the Chapter of Dimna’s Trial. On Ibn al-Nadīm’s use of these 
categories and specifically on samar, see Sh. M. Toorawi, Ibn Abī Tāhir Tayfūr and Arabic Writerly 
Culture: a Ninth-century Bookman in Bagdad (London, 2005), pp. 48-49, also mentioned in L. 
Marlow, “Among Kings and Sages. Greek and Indian Wisdom in an Arabic Mirror for Princes”, 
Arabica, 60 (2013), pp. 1-57: pp. 8-10. See also pp. 14-15 for details on the significant merit Pseudo-
Māwardī attributed to the KD.  
6
  This scholarly puzzlement is perfectly summarised by the reliable F. de Blois, “Kalila wa-Dimna”, in  
The Routledge Encyclopedia of Arabic Literature, J. S. Meisami and P. Starkey (eds), (London, New 
York, 1998 reprint 2010), p. 424: “But in the end it is unlikely that anyone ever learnt either politics or 
morals from this book [of KD]: the supposed pedagogical content is little more than an ostensible 
justification for what to a Muslim reader would otherwise have seemed a trivial work of 
4 
 
I, in contrast, think one ought to take very seriously the text’s reputed primary focus 
on political advice. Here are the premises of my case: I submit that the text’s 
millennium-long vitality, coupled to the remarkable personalities of rewriters and 
translators, some of whom were situated within the highest echelons of the political 
curriculum, provides two strong indicators of this work’s relevance to political actors, 
which weighs more in my scale opinion than even the reliable and influential Ibn al-
Nadīm’s apparently unequivocally down-grading appraisal opinion. That the text has 
such a long history shows the relevance of its contents for the ruling elite (the source 
of literary patronage), irrespective of timeframe and cultural background.
7
  
 
It is heartening that this point of view is endorsed by medieval authors themselves in 
their introductions to KD versions
8
: this, they say in effect, is a timeless Mirror for 
Princes, a pedagogy for rulers of universal, trans-cultural and a-temporal applicability. 
As here, in the words of Vā’iz Kāshifī: 
 
 و دنا هدرک عمج شوحو و تارشح و رويط و عابس و مياهب نابز زا هک تسيباتک ناتسودنه کولم نيازخ رد
 یواطم رد ديآ راکب یهاشداپ دعاوق تياعر رد ار نارادناهج و دياش مزح و تسايس باب رد ار نيطلاس هچ ره
آ و هدومن داريا نآ قاروانوم ره ۀيامرس ارعه ۀليسو و تظ.دنسانشيم تعفنم ر  
 
                                                                                                                                            
entertainment”. The traditional deprecation of the text’s contents can lead to levelling its use to 
childhood memories as typified by Muhammad al-Tunği’s comments: “Für die Erwachsenen wurde es 
geschaffen damit sie aus der Moral der Geschichten ihre Lehren ziehen und sich außerdem die 
süßentage ihrer Kindheit zurückholen. So ist denn dieses Buch für jede Generation und jede Zeit 
geschrieben” Muhammad al-Tunği, “Kalila und Dimnas Reisen durch die Welt,” in Von listigen 
Schakalen, M. Fansa and E. Grunewald (eds), (Wiesbaden, 2008), p. 194. 
7
 Translators or rewriters within the Arabo-Persian sphere, such as Ibn al-Muqaffa’, Nasrullah Munshī, 
Abū’l-Fazl, are actors within the highest political spheres of their time; and beyond the cultural borders 
of the Islamic world, the fables are rewritten by authors such as the Infant Alphonso the Wise (r. 1252-
1284), or the French Gilbert Gaulmin (d. 1665), who dwells amongst Chancelier Seguier’s advisors. 
8
 These passages are of pre-eminent importance, though I am naturally aware of their often codified 
contents and also of the explicit or implicit way in which preliminary remarks, prefaces and authorial 
introductions guide the reader’s reception of a given piece. These may have a positive impact on our 
understanding of the work or just as equally hamper it. See U. Eco, Les Limites de l’interprétation, 
(1990, French translation S.l., 1992); A. Cheikh-Moussa, “Du discours autorisé ou Comment s’adresser 
au tyran ?,” Arabica, T. 46/2 (1999), pp. 169-170, www.jstor.org/stable/4057494. 
5 
Among the treasures of the kings of Hindustan there is a book compiled from 
the speech of savage beasts and predators, creeping and wild animals; and all 
that befits sovereigns in matters of government and strength of judgment, and 
is useful for worldly rulers in the observance of the rules of kingcraft, is shown 
in the folds of its pages and [people] regard it as the stock of all advice and 
the medium of all advantage.
 9
 
 
Despite such attempts at calibrating our expectations in the realm of political advice 
for rulers, academia has not taken this up in descriptions and studies of the text. I put 
the greatest part of this misunderstanding at the door of the text’s numerous 
expressions of moral and wisedom truisms.  
 
By considering these latter as harmonious, as a basso continuo of explanatory inserts 
meant to summarise the gist of the context in which they appear, we in fact nullify 
their effect and misapprehend their purpose, seemingly unaware that, in addition, this 
comes with a requirement to distort the point of the stories. I suggest that it is more 
correct to understand them across the board, as partaking of a different, stylistic or 
dialectic, dimension, filling a contrapuntal
10
 mission, as I will set out below in an 
assessment of the nature and contents of the chapter under examination.
11
  
                                                 
9
 Vā’iz Kāshifī, Anvār-i Suhaylī, ed. p. 5, tr. p. 6. All quotations within this essay are taken from the 
following edition: Kāshifī, Mawla Kamāl al-Dīn Husayn b. ‘Alī Bayhaghī mashhur be Vā’iz Kāshefī, 
Anvār-i Suhaylī yā Kalīla wa Dimna-yi Kāshifī, Amīr Kabīr (eds), Tihrān 1362 (3rd ed.) (AS ed.). I also 
refer in the notes to the following translation: The Anvar-i Suhaili or The lights of Canopus, Being the 
Persian Version of The Fables of Pilpay; or the Book “Kalilah and Damnah,” rendered into Persian by 
Husain Va’iz u’l-Kashefi, literally translated into Prose and Verse by Edward B. Eastwick, (Hertford, 
1854, reprint S.l., 2005) (AS tr.). I found it necessary to rework the translations as my understanding of 
the Persian text often departs from that offered by Eastwick.  
For the debates in the Medieval Arabic world around animal’s speech, see A. Ghersetti, “Des animaux 
parlants. Modèles littéraires et contraintes idéologiques”, The Arabist. Budapest Studies in Arabic, 32 
(2013), pp. 26-27: “La difficulté à accepter l’idée que les animaux puissent s’exprimer comme les 
hommes dérive du fait que parole (manṭiq) et intellect (caql) sont intimement liés.” The Anvār-e 
Sohaylī seems to have transcended this difficulty related to animal speech and even proceeded to allow 
Qur’anic iqtibās by animal speakers, see my discussion below. 
10
 I understand counterpoint as the musical compositional technique which combines two or more 
independent voices or melodic lines in order to produce a polyphonic piece of music. The vertical 
combination of these separate voices may create moments of consonance alternating with the 
6 
 
The thoughts in the form of sententiae which occur within the dialogues or the 
narrative, contain lessons of wisdom, ethics or morality. Because they were 
understood as meaningful, they have acted as a red herring. Consideration of 
secondary literature shows this red herring’s undesirable success: it influences 
analysis into massaging the contents of the stories in order to create a moral ambiance 
and thus to conform to a hypothetic textual aim of commonplace morality, while the 
fables’ core meaning dwindles out of academia’s sight. This phenomenon, resulting 
from an unwitting misunderstanding of the contrapuntal technique mentioned above, 
is nevertheless understandable as it is comforted by several elements: the links 
between advice literature and ethics, those between fables and morality and those 
between political philosophy and ethics, are as strong as a rope. Paraphrasing de 
Fouchécour, we could say that authors of Mirrors for Princes unceasingly stalk the 
                                                                                                                                            
prevailing dissonances. I believe this is a fitting description of the mutual relationship between the KD 
narrative and the expressions of moral dimension present in this text. It might also, usefully, be 
extended to analyses of other prosimetric texts, such as Sa’dī’s Gulistān.  Basso continuo, on the 
contrary, refers here to a continuous, uneventful musical accompaniment, its role being limited to 
underlining the harmonic structure of the piece.  
11
 The difficulties offered by the traditional attitude which gives prominence to the moral truisms, are 
encapsulated in the French scholar C.-H. de Fouchécour’s puzzled descriptive and generalising remarks 
on the KD (C.-H. de Fouchécour, Moralia : les notions morales dans la littérature persane du 3
e
/9
e
 au 
7
e
/13
e
 siècles, Institut Français de Recherche en Iran, Bibliothèque Iranienne, 32 (Paris, 1986), p. 418): 
“Les grandes leçons de KD rejoignent celles des Miroirs primitifs. Cependant, ces leçons sont aussi des 
occasions de sagesse (tantra) en ce sens que les dialogues et les débats dont les intrigues des contes 
reçoivent leur éclairage, sont souvent constitués de pièces tout apprêtées sur des sujets des plus 
traditionnels en morale. La trame des contes est vaste et elle permet de décomposer des situations 
typiques à propos desquelles est développé tout ce qu’il y a à dire avec la tradition dans chaque cas. 
Dans le fil du discours viennent aussi se placer, comme des refrains, des lieux communs de la morale.” 
The versions of the Sanskrit text also contain similar verse sententiae, though the amorality of the 
Pancatantra has long been recognised and the text is identified by J. Hertel as focussing on political 
intelligence, showing how deviousness (List) brings success. He refutes the idea that the author of the 
Pancatantra had any moral purpose interest for morality and concludes that any moral element is a 
later addition. (J. Hertel (1914) pp. 10-11). This was challenged by later authors such as Edgerton, but 
has been re-introduced robustly and convincingly by P. Olivelle (tr.) The Pancatantra. The Book of 
India’s Folk Wisdom. A new translation by Patrick Olivelle, Oxford World’s Classics (Oxford, 1977, 
reprint 2007), pp. xxiii-xxiv. See also below a similar understanding of the text expressed by Kāshifī.  
7 
rulers with calls to morality.
12
 However, though undoubtedly a MfP, the KD text 
departs significantly in form and scope from the bulk of traditional texts, which no 
doubt was the reason behind its success. 
 
Alerted by the medieval authors and rewriters of the fables and further fortified by my 
own reading, I argue here against considering the moral-ethical dimension as the 
central or unique lever of interest. I even submit that there is in fact no such 
dimension within the story which is analysed below. And I attempt to redress the 
balance, championing the candid authorial advice to read the fables as a MfP which is 
not concerned with morality: there surely is a virtue in taking into consideration the 
introductory authorial remarks to this effect, rather than shrugging them away 
immediately as meaningless boast! Our findings and the meaning we can give to the 
contents will be indication enough of how genuine these remarks are. 
 
This essay examines the chapter known as Dimna’s Trial in one particular KD 
version: the Anvār-i Suhaylī, (AS), the fifteenth-century Persian prose rewriting by 
Husayn Vā’iz Kāshifī (d. 1504-5). This work is a pre-eminent example of an 
undervalued palimpsest: it is at least four stages removed from the presumed and 
legendary Sanskrit original and has been much criticised on account of its style and 
length.
13
 To me, this work is an incessant source of renewed wonder and multiple 
discoveries. In particular, I have detected in Kāshifī’s rewriting a heightened 
awareness of multiple levels of philosophical implications offered by the chapter 
which this essay focuses on. This prolific author lived at the Timurid Herat court of 
Sultan Husayn Bayqara, and presented Persian studies with the example of an 
intriguing scholarly personality. Generally considered a compiler and populariser of 
                                                 
12
 C.H. de Fouchécour (1986) p. 12, speaks of le harcèlement de l’homme au pouvoir. See also his 
Chapter 4 on MfP (pp. 357-444). D. Gutas, “Ethische Schriften im Islam,” Orientalisches Mittelalter, 
(ed.) W. Heinrichs (Wiesbaden, 1990), pp. 346-365 and L. Marlow, Hierarchy and Egalitarianism in 
Islamic Thought (Cambridge, 1994), pp. 117-142. 
13
 For the current disregard of this work, see C. van Ruymbeke, “Kashifi’s Forgotten masterpiece: Why 
Rediscover the Anvār-i Suhaylī?”, Iranian Studies 36/4 (2003), pp. 571-588. See also Maria E. 
Subtelny, “Husayn Va’iz-i Kashifi: Polymath, Popularizer, and Preserver”, Iranian Studies, 36/4, 
(2003), pp. 463-467. This special edition of Iranian Studies reintroduces Kāshifī upon the scene of 
Persian Studies. 
8 
the state of the art across a wide range of fields of learning in late medieval Iran, he 
gives evidence of his creative engagement with the source text of the Anvār-i Suhaylī. 
The changes he introduces in his version are by no means simply cosmetic: his 
clarifications, additions and excisions mirror his understanding of the story and 
consequently channel ours.  
 
In his introduction, Kāshifī identifies two main reasons for embarking on the 
rewriting of the fables: his predecessor’s excessive use of Arabic words, expressions 
and quotations, which are outdated and make the reading of the text arduous for his 
contemporary audience. As will become clear below, the authorial promise this 
remark implies should not be understood as the wish to achieve a complete purge of 
the Arabic expressions that carry a direct link to the religious sphere. The second 
reason is the necessity to simplify and clarify the meaning of the fables which 
otherwise need constant exegesis.
14
 Implicit in this latter point is the promise that 
Kāshifī’s version will provide the reader with indispensible tools to decode the fables.  
 
Presumably with this aim in mind, and as he does for all the parts of the book, Kāshifī 
has expanded the chapter of Dimna’s Trial which he inherited from Nasrullah 
Munshī’s twelfth-century Persian KD (itself a translation of an Ibn al-Muqaffa‘ 
version in Arabic) with further dialogues, quotations, and new illustrative hikāyats. 
His attempts at clarifying the story’s purport with the help of useful exegetical details, 
are not successful at first glance: the added details tamper with the logical crystalline 
construction and give the impression of muddling his predecessor’s line of 
argumentation. Nasrullah Munshī’s version itself, though claiming a direct heredity to 
the Arabic Ibn al-Muqaffa‘ text, differs significantly from the surviving Arabic 
versions and deepens the philosophical interest of the debates around Dimna’s guilt. 
The present study is based on the Anvār’s version of the frame-story itself and will 
not attempt to address the illustrative hikāyats.  
 
 
* 
*     * 
                                                 
14
 AS, ed. p. 7, tr. pp. 8-9. 
9 
 
Within the Book of Kalila and Dimna proper, the contents of its second chapter 
known as Dimna’s Trial, could be described as unsatisfying and unmemorable.15 It is 
not a favourite within the collection of fables, perhaps because, as we will see, its 
contents are too jarring to permit smooth reduction to the level of children stories, the 
synopsis of its story, the setting and the animals’ actions, speeches and thoughts are 
all too close to those of human society and codes to carry across the excitement of a 
multifaceted and universally applicable animal fable.
16
  
 
The mention it is wont to receive in scholarly literature is as an addition made by the 
eighth-century Arabic translator Ibn al-Muqaffa‘ to the putative Pahlavi original in 
order to erase the immorality of the previous chapter (that of the Lion and the Bull).
17
 
                                                 
15
 The actual KD stories are preceded by several introductory or preliminary chapters, whose number is 
not stable across versions. The first chapter of the actual fables is that of the Lion and the Bull. 
16
 See R. Forster (2009), pp. 217. From her study of the terminology used to describe this chapter, 
Forster concludes that Dimna’s Trial does not contain fables, but Erzählungen which could be 
described as pseudo-historical exempla. 
17
 This is the common understanding of the chapter’s meaning and message. See for example: “[Ibn al-
Muqaffa‘] added after the first book of the Pañcatantra a chapter written by himself on Dimna’s trial 
(chap. 6 in de Sacy), which by punishing the traitor satisfies the feeling of justice outraged by the 
immoral teachings of this book.” C. Brockelmann, "Kalīla Wa-Dimna." Encyclopaedia of Islam, 
Second Edition, (eds) P. Bearman, Th. Bianquis, C. E. Bosworth, E. van Donzel, W. P. Heinrichs (Brill 
Online, 2013). This is also the conclusion arrived at in a recent work on Ibn al-Muqaffa’, (I. T. Kristó-
Nagy, La pensee d’Ibn al-Muqaffa’. Un “agent-double” dans le monde persan et arabe, Studia 
Arabica XIX (Paris, 2012), pp. 138-142). See also C. Bürgel’s remark in his Nachwort to ‘Abdallah Ibn 
al-Muqaffa’, Kalila und Dimna Die Fabeln des Bidpai. Aus den Arabischen übertragen von Philipp 
Wolff, (Paris, 1816, reprint Manesse Bibliothek der Weltliterature, 1995), p. 300. 
We also find mentions of the similarity between Dimna’s condemnation and Ibn al-Muqaffa‘’s 
assassination. These are clearly a posteriori musings: when the eighth-century author engaged in his 
composition he would not have been aware of his ultimate sorry faith. It is perhaps also worth noting 
here that Kāshifī has not kept the prefaces by Ibn al-Muqaffa’ and Burzoy, present in the older 
versions. I am unaware of the extent to which Kāshifī’s audience would have kept the memory of this 
seven-centuries-old drama and it seems to me that the chapter was distanced in their minds from the 
original author’s biography. 
The other element commentators are wont to mention – but are at a loss to decode - in relation to this 
chapter is the intriguing (and apparently pointless?) similarity between Ibn al-Muqaffa‘’s Persian name 
and that of Ruzba, the jackal who brings the news of Kalīla’s death and, under farcical fervent oaths of 
10 
Continuing, for expediency’s sake to call him Ibn al-Muqaffa‘, I will leave aside the 
examination of the identity of the chapter’s original author, which has been 
challenged recently.
18
 My focus resides in the second part of the above assertion. This 
commonly accepted interpretation and reduction of the chapter’s scope needs radical 
reassessment. Preliminary to any analysis comes the difficulty of clearly defining 
morality, as opposed to common sense, ethic, or specific wisdom sententiae. I have 
found no indication that previous studies have been particularly restrictive in the way 
they understood these terms and I will continue here in the same vein, making an easy 
virtue of including all the above under the general heading of “morality”.19  
 
It is a problematic view that considers this additional chapter as a sequel erasing the 
triumph which crowns Dimna’s successful (although, as I outline below, it carries the 
seeds of his ultimate fall) amoral manipulation in the first chapter. It clouds our 
understanding of both the first and of the second chapter. Common sense dictates 
several remarks: a long and verbose chapter was not necessary in order to achieve 
Dimna’s punishment. A simple paragraph mentioning his exposure as a villain and his 
ensuing punishment could have been hitched on to the first chapter, achieving a 
                                                                                                                                            
sudden friendship, is offered Kalīla’s egg-nest nest-egg and agrees to spy for the imprisoned Dimna. 
Any conjectured relevance in this homonymy paints the Arabic author as a character of shady political 
actions, or even of questionable morality.   
18
 See J. Janos, who suggests a Sassanian author for this chapter, or at the very least someone writing in 
the mixed ambiance of Sassanian and Islamic legal systems: J. Janos, “The Origins of the Kalilah wa 
Dimnah. Reconsideration in the Light of Sassanian Legal History” Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society 
22, 3&4 (July & Oct 2012), pp. 505-518. 
19
 Although I do not propose to distinguish here between ethic and morality, I note that C.-H. de 
Fouchécour attempts to differentiate ethic, as a philosophical approach of our devoir-être, from 
morality(s), as the ways in which societies envisage what is reasonable, not on a theoretical level, but 
on that of action. He suggests understanding the term as referring to practical reason rather than to 
practical wisdom. (C. H. de Fouchécour, Moralia : les notions morales dans la littérature persane du 
3
e
/9
e
 au 7
e
/13
e
 siècles, Institut Français de Recherche en Iran, Bibliothèque Iranienne, no 32 (Paris, 
1986), pp. 7-8). He quotes G. Genette (Figures II (Paris, 1969), p. 73) who defines it as “a body of 
maxims and preconceptions which constitutes at once a vision of the world and a system of values.” 
See also Gutas’s detailed definition of ethics in D. Gutas, “Ethische Schriften im Islam”, in 
Orientalisches Mittelalter, (ed.) W. Heinrichs (Wiesbaden, 1990), p. 346. I unfortunately have been 
unable to examine the unpublished work by M. P. Stanley, A Study of Ethics of El libro de Calila e 
Digna, Ph.D. (Indiana University, 1969). 
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similar effect to the punishment of the wicked advisors in the parallel chapter of the 
Pious Jackal.
20
 In addition, the chapter is not centred on the actual punishment of 
Dimna which only receives terse mention at the very end, depriving the audience from 
savouring the most basic Schadenfreude. It forms a particularly weak anticlimax: the 
scant and gory details of Dimna’s faith do not enlist our sympathy, nor are they 
explicit enough to make us shiver with horror. In Kāshifī’s version:  
 
 دندينادرگ بذعم ديدهت و ديدشت عاون اب هتفرگ زاب وزا همعط و دنتشاد زاب طايتحاب هتسب رب ار وا ات دومرف ريش ات
 لقن خزود نادنزب نادنز خزود زا هديسر ورد ردغو رکم تمائش و دش یرپس یگنشت و یگنسرگ زا سبح رد
  درک 
The Lion commanded that they should keep [Dimna] carefully in ward, and 
that they should withhold his food and torture him with various severities and 
threats, so that he eventually expired of hunger and thirst in the prison: the 
disgrace of his deception and perfidy reaching him, he passed from the hell of 
imprisonment to the incarceration of hell.
21
 
 
Even the trial itself goes awry and does not achieve Dimna’s humiliating public 
chastisement by the court, but rather describes his ultimate excellence in arguing his 
case. To privilege the moral teleology is to consider the whole chapter as the work of 
a bad story-teller indeed, pointlessly delaying a hoped-for catharsis. Nevertheless, the 
above traditional explanation for the chapter’s composition, which does not survive a 
scrupulous assessment of the text, continues to be proposed and repeated.  
 
Kāshifī himself warns us against taking for granted the automatic presence of morality 
in the KD text, despite its being both a book of advice and a collection of fables. He 
expresses reserve towards the traditional bias that reads akhlāq within the stories. In 
the authorial introduction, he explains: 
 
                                                 
20
 See also below footnotes 23 and 55. 
21
 AS, ed. p. 219; tr. pp. 247-248. Nasrullah Munshī’s version (Nasrullah Munshī, Tarjuma-yi Kalila 
wa Dimna, Mujtaba Minovi ed. (s.l., 1343)) is equally terse. These Persian authors have thus resolved 
the problem of the non-Islamic prison execution found in the Arabic versions, spotted by Janos (2012). 
12 
 بيذهتب قلعت هچنآ و نيرخآ نيعون زا دياوف یضعب رب  هروکذم هثلث ماسقا زا تسا لمتشم روکذم باتک و...
 دوب لاجم ار قلاخا مراکم زا یخرب داريا دنچ ره سپ دارطتسا ليبس رب رگم تسين روکذم یورد دراد قلاخا
يغت هک ميتساوخن ام...دباي هار باتک عاضوا هب یلک ري  
 
… and the said book comprehends the three kinds that have just been 
mentioned [i.e. morality, domestic economy and civic economy], and various 
advantages connected with the latter sorts. That which refers to “refinement of 
morals” is not treated, save as a misleading ploy (bar sabīl-i istitrād). Thus, 
although it would have been possible to prove that morality brings a few 
benefits, we were unwilling to allow a complete change in the arrangement of 
the book…22 
 
If not morality, what then could be the focus of this long-winded, verbose chapter? 
The forensic technicalities of the trial and the information about the judiciary system 
found within the chapter have received attention in a couple of interesting articles, 
royalty’s active meddling in the judicial system has been mentioned, the similarities 
and oppositions between this and the older chapter of the Pious Jackal have been 
noted.
23
 Useful as they are, these studies however, do not engage with the actual 
synopsis of the sequel’s story, with the global reality of the action and the 
                                                 
22
 AS, ed. p. 9, tr. p. 12. I have presented this point of view in ISIS London, 2006: “A new Approach to 
the Anvar-e Sohayli as a Political Science Text”. Kāshifī also wrote a work on akhlāq. See M. E. 
Subtelny, “A Late Medieval Persian Summa on Ethics: Kashefi’s Akhlāq-i Muhsinī”, Iranian Studies, 
vol. 36/4  (2003), pp. 601-613. 
My translation here significantly differs from what is proposed by Eastwick. The term istitrād, 
(translated by Eastwick as “incident”), is of particular relevance in my thesis on the contrapuntal use of 
morality, as it carries the main meaning of “aiming at one thing and getting another; feigning a retreat 
before the enemy” [F. Steingass, A Comprehensive Persian-English Dictionary, (reprinted Beirut, 
1944), p. 53].  
23
 J. Janos (2012) and also A. Hamori, “Shameful and injurious: an idea of Ibn al-Muqaffa’‘s in Kalīla 
wa-Dimna and al-Adab al-kabīr”, Jerusalem Studies in Arabic and Islam, XXXII (2006), pp. 189-212. 
C. F. Audebert, « La condition humaine d’après ‘Kalila wa Dimna’ », Arabica, 46/3 (1999), pp. 287-
312, remarks on the interest of the chapter’s expression of a king’s judicial duties (though see below, 
my analysis of the trial’s mechanics showing the perversion by the ruler of the judiciary). The chapter 
on the Pious Jackal is already present in the Old Syriac Version (Schulthess (1911), pp. 84-92, who 
mentions that its origin is to be found in Book 12, (4930 ff/or 5133 ff/ or 4084 ff) of the Mahabharata). 
See also F. de Blois (1990), p. 13a and I. Kristo-Nagy (2012), pp. 139-140. 
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signification of the dialogues. Above all, none doubts that the sequel’s finality is 
morality’s ultimate victory achieved by the punishment of the cynic rogue, thus 
wiping out the previous chapter’s demonstration.  
 
Thus, the chapter appears to be groaning under a double moral/ethical load: (a) the 
presumed moral impetus for its composition: this traditional but mystifying focus on 
morality, I argue, is due to the ethical ambiance prevalent in both works of advice and 
fables. It results in misinterpretation by ethically-aware commentators of KD, which 
overwhelms and crushes the stories’ synopsis. It relates to the full line of versions, 
onwards from Ibn al-Muqaffa‘’s probable authoring of this additional chapter, and it 
needs to be evacuated; (b) the expressed lessons, pro- and epimythium, embedded 
verses, hikāyats and sententiae: these I view as alien to the voice of the core synopsis. 
Decoding the frame story is smoother when sealing it off from this moral contrapuntal 
voice, which I even understand as partaking of didactic stylistics, inculcating the 
obfuscating rhetorical use of received truths. I do detect however, a third central and 
relevant involvement with a moral/ethical issue: (c) the interface between rhetoric and 
morality.  
 
In what follows, after arguing against the reality of the first moral load (a) and after 
attempting to decode the nature of the second load (b) and examining first its 
irreducibility with the central argument of the story, but also positing its concurrent 
and hitherto unrecognised use in rhetorical argumentation, I will submit that the three-
layered didactic purpose specific to Dimna’s Trial in fact consists first in a lesson in 
political (amoral) defence strategies, secondly in a didactical illustration of (amoral) 
rhetorical and dialectical techniques within Dimna’s Apologia, finally and most 
interestingly, in an exposition of the philosophical conundrum of rhetoric’s interplay 
with morality, mentioned above as load (c).  
 
What happens in Kāshifī’s version of Chapter II? 
The chapter is unusual within the global plan of the book inasmuch as its frame-story 
forms a sequel to that of the previous chapter of the Lion and the Bull. This latter 
ended with the Lion King killing the Bull. The jackal’s path is now once again open 
and there is a good chance that he will indeed become the king’s closest advisor. The 
sequel however does not propose this triumph; it builds upon the crucial 
14 
miscalculation which Dimna’s plan contains: by using the king to achieve the Bull’s 
demise, Dimna has not foreseen, despite Kalīla’s warnings, the damaging effects this 
murder will have on the king’s position; these will force the ruler to react. Failure to 
consider the long-term results of his actions is clearly Dimna’s main weakness, as 
similarly, in the first story, he had not paused to consider the possible consequences of 
introducing the Bull to the king’s entourage.  
 
The sequel opens in media res: the King has calmed down after the murder of the 
Bull. Deeply depressed and neglecting his royal office, he now confides to the 
Leopard that he in fact regrets having killed the Bull and misses his kind and honest 
presence. The Leopard berates the Lion for brooding over something which cannot be 
undone. He needs to ascertain whether the Bull was really guilty – in which case he 
should not regret killing him -, or was the Bull the victim of slander – in which case 
he must make and exemplary punishment of the slanderer. The Lion invests the 
Leopard with the mission to investigate this. By a stroke of luck, the Leopard happens 
to overhear Kalīla scolding Dimna for the murderous result of his slander and 
severing their ties in the hope of escaping a share in Dimna’s inevitably catastrophic 
fate. Dimna sees no point in regretting and admits to having yielded to overriding 
ambition.
24
 The Leopard hurries to the Queen Mother and swearing her to secrecy, 
tells her what he has overheard. Upon finding the King still depressed and first 
showing great reluctance to betray the Leopard’s secret, nevertheless the Queen 
Mother does so as it is to the advantage of the state. Upon the Lion’s promise that he 
will punish the culprit, she accuses Dimna of slander and of being the ultimate cause 
of the Bull’s death. The King calls together his complete court, Dimna is summoned 
and accused publicly by the Queen Mother. Dimna defends himself well and a court 
of justice is organised the next days to get to the truth. Dimna manages to silence his 
accusers by clever use of rhetoric and dialectics. In a last meeting in prison with 
Kalīla, the two friends realise that Kalīla will be put to the question and will 
inevitably betray Dimna. After a sleepless night and in order to avoid both the 
physical torture and the ensuing moral torture of betraying his friend, Kalīla prefers to 
                                                 
24
 It is nowhere made obvious that he actually thoughtfully engineered the Bull’s death. His slander 
meant to instil distrust between the two friends, not necessarily to lead to murder, which he had neither 
foreseen nor wished. Note also how the passage introduces a striking opposition between the Lion who 
broods and regrets his action, and Dimna who refuses to do so.  
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die.
25
 Now, very grateful to Kalīla for having found this solution to his Achilles heel, 
Dimna is in a position to continue his brilliant self-defence, in front of a tongue-tied 
and bemused court, much to the Queen Mother’s chagrin. She now agrees to disclose 
to the King the name of the Leopard, her mysterious informant. An inmate, who has 
overheard Dimna’s last dialogue with Kalīla, acts as a last-minute second witness. 
Dimna is hurriedly sentenced, tortured and left to die of starvation and harsh 
treatment.  
 
 
Geradezu zynisch? 
As mentioned above, the chapter under consideration is usually said to owe its very 
existence to the rewriter’s need to give morality a chance to win the day. This thorny 
problem of its moral essence and aim needs to be dealt with as a first step in my 
examination of morality’s place within Dimna’s Trial.  
 
The accepted view that this sequel to the story of the Lion and the Bull is a response 
to Ibn al-Muqaffa‘’s or his ‘Abbasid patrons’ dissatisfaction with the amorality of the 
first part of the story is untenable for several reasons, the most obvious of which, we 
saw, is its problematic cancellation of the previous chapter’s results and its focus on 
the anticlimactic end which leads to denying any interest to the major part of the 
chapter. In all events, it is safer to leave conjectures about the author’s and his 
                                                 
25
 Suicide is not mentioned explicitly, though I consider it is evident. In Kāshifī’s version, the 
unexpected news of Kalīla’s demise comes without any explanation, as in Nasrullah’s version (1343), 
p. 99) and in the translations by Wolff [Ibn al Muqaffa’ (1816 reprinted 1995), p. 105] and Khawam 
[Ibn al-Mouqaffa’, Le pouvoir et les intellectuels ou les aventures de Kalila et Dimna, traduction 
intégrale faite sur les manuscrits par René. R. Khawam, (Paris, 1985), p. 196]. Another Arabic version 
has Kalila dying of a tummy upset [Ibn al-Muqaffa’, le Livre de Kalila et Dimna, traduit de l’arabe par 
André Miquel (reprint Paris, 1980), p. 119], which can only be a metaphor for (self-)poisoning. This 
seems to have escaped commentators, who also see in Kalīla’s sudden death a punishment for falling 
short of the Zoroastrian ideals of good actions, good words, good thoughts. (I. Kristo-Nagy, 2012, p. 
142.)  
In his translation of the rajah’s introductory brief to Bidpai at the head of the sequel, Eastwick 
interprets a rather unclear sentence (تسب لايخ هليح مادکب دوخ صلخم و ) as meaning “what stratagem his 
friend devised”, which then comforts the idea that Kalīla’s death was a stratagem meant to hamper the 
case against Dimna. See however note 50 below. 
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patrons’ ethics well alone and forgetting about possible motives, to consider whether 
morality is indeed present, how it is built into the synopsis and whether it wins the 
day. 
 
Richter in his 1932 study on Ancient Mirrors for Princes,
26
 is a lonely, though 
insightful, voice questioning the ‘moral’ character of the chapter. Sadly, his analysis 
did not attract much interest and failed to correct the prevalent view on the chapter’s 
promotion of morality. I base myself on his findings for the initial part of the present 
demonstration. I summarise thus Richter’s arguments (following an Arabic version of 
the text ascribed to Ibn al-Muqaffa‘,27 which is not absolutely concurrent with 
Kāshifī’s version of the trial): disagreeing with Nöldeke,28 Richter states that morality 
has no place in the way in which Dimna’s slanderous action is punished. The 
accusations of the two witnesses which effect Dimna’s downfall, rest only on 
hearsay.
29
 The final condemnation rests on chance, rather than on internal evidence.
30
 
Thus the case ends in the most ‘unjust’ of manners with unproven slander effecting 
Dimna’s demise. It is Dimna’s defence against this slander which is central, not his 
eventual condemnation. He is not using mere sophistry when accusing his 
prosecutors’ arguments of being unfound, they are indeed so; no-one is able to bring 
the merest scrap of proof against him. In the course of this defence, Dimna uses 
                                                 
26
 G. Richter, Studien zur Geschichte der Älteren Fürstenspiegel (Leipzig, 1932), pp. 22-27. (The 
quotations below are my paraphrase from the German.) Sabine Obermaier has adopted Richter’s 
conclusions in her discussion of Dimna’s slander and defence within Anton von Pforr’s German 
version: S. Obermaier, Das Fabelbuch als Rahmenerzählung. Intertextualität und Intratextualität als 
Wege zur Interpretation des Buchs des Beispiele der alten Weisen Antons von Pforr (Heidelberg, 
2004), esp. p. 191. 
27
 Richter (1932), p. 23 n.2. Richter has used the editions by Silvestre de Sacy (1816), Guidi (1873) and 
that of 1905 (die wichtigste und relative beste Ausgabe) by Cheikho. 
28
 Nöldeke (1905), pp. 794-806. On p. 797, we find the opinion that with this ending to the Kalila-
Dimna stories, Ibn al Muqaffa‘ corrects die siegreiche Unmoral des indischen Erzählers. 
29
  This is not totally correct: the accusation is based on a witness who overheard Dimna admitting his 
slanderous action in a private conversation.  
30
  Again, this is technically not quite correct, as I explain below: the two witnesses are called in 
because Dimna’s rhetorical and dialectical defence is too well-built to be countered by any argument 
taken from forensic rhetoric. His guilt has been decided but the king wants a public legal 
condemnation. There is thus a need for counter-arguments taken from “outside the art” of rhetoric and 
provided by two witnesses. 
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ethical arguments to explain his past amoral actions and the strangest situation arises: 
der Bösewicht hat durchaus recht (“the nasty character comes out throughout the case 
with the law on his side”). The attitude of the King Lion is also opposed to morality. 
He has killed his friend the Bull, acting on bad advice and he will now act similarly in 
the case of Dimna. The Lion has no way of knowing or proving that Dimna has used 
slander. His condemnation rests on nothing but suspicion by his closest advisors, and 
on the Queen Mother’s dislike for Dimna, - but it is never proven that this is not in 
fact intrigue, and on his own lack of trust in Dimna, in view of the jackal’s superior 
intelligence and rhetorical skills. In Richter’s words, in the arguments brought against 
Dimna, and in the attitude of the king, [kann] von einem ‘Sieg der Moral’ gar nicht 
gesprochen werden. (“One can’t in any way speak of ‘morality’s victory’.”) 
 
Although Richter very convincingly does away with the notion of morality as the 
main lever of the sequel story, he still stumbles on the ethical issue and stops short of 
the next logical step: ponderings on the disproportionate exemplary punishment of 
Dimna suggest that the chapter is not about justice either. And Richter also misses the 
reason for the chapter’s second focus on lengthy – and apparently pointless –
dialectics. In fact the story is neither about the moral punishment of slander, nor about 
royal justice, nor about their harmonious collaboration, but rather about the ruthless 
clash of two levels of manipulation: political against rhetorical with the ultimate and 
desirable victory of the former, crushing the dangerous rhetorical agent. 
 
Richter does mention the forensic rhetorical interest – “The narration does not keep 
Dimna’s punishment central… His defence is central, not his condemnation. (p. 25)”, 
but his conclusion misses the point I will be making. He gets bogged down in his 
struggle with the fact that Dimna adduces the same moral and wise arguments as are 
used in “positive” situations (such as in the chapter of the Owls and Crows). Rather 
than considering this as problematic, I argue that this is the crux of the whole chapter 
as an illustration of the skilled use of rhetoric and dialectic techniques, a facet of 
significant importance in courtly education. Unawareness of this leads to Richter’s 
discomfort with the “conscious use of ethical wisdom within a thoroughly immoral 
action” (p. 26) and to his regret that the art with which moral sentences are used to 
defend a miscreant is geradezu zynisch zu nennen. This barren conclusion wraps up 
his analysis.  
18 
  
The present essay departs from other attempts at decoding the meaning of the frame 
story because, as does Richter, it refuses to be misled by the misunderstanding 
proposing that morality is present in the story itself. This derives from a too-hasty 
amalgamation of the KD with traditional MfP. These latter, as Bosworth describes, 
have a “twofold intention: a practical one, the exercise of Realpolitik in public life, the 
approach in Renaissance Italian times of Machiavelli in his famous treatise The 
Prince, what in Arabic was called siyāsa or tadbīr al-mulk; and an ethical one, the 
making of this practice, as far as possible, conformable to the justice and 
righteousness that God requires of those of His creatures who happen to be entrusted 
with power over others”.31 The undeniable difficulty in tracking down morality within 
the KD stories is instanced in C.-H. de Fouchécour’s conclusions on Nasrullah 
Munshī’s KD version. The French scholar, whose analysis is centred on the theme of 
morality running as a red thread through Persian literary texts, is at pains to place the 
fables within this theme:  
The idea of reason-wisdom (khirad), without doubt one of the dominant ideas 
of the book, is in fact, anything but simple: the whole of the KD is an attempt 
at presenting its multiple facets, and in particular the good and bad aspects of 
deviousness (la raison rusée). […] Nasrullah Munshī has kept, in his rewriting 
of KD, this character of the book which is a vast reservoir of the most 
traditional morality, un-influenced by Sufism.
32
  
 
That Sufism is absent from the fables is evident, but that they could retain 
meaningfulness as a reservoir of traditional morality while concurrently illustrating la 
raison rusée, is an argument that holds with difficulty and is nevertheless 
symptomatic of the current doxa about the fables.  
 
Searching for a stated morality in dialogues, exempla and prosimetrum 
Now that we have eliminated not only the centrality within the synopsis, but indeed 
even the likelihood of the existence of a moral aim that would explain the addition of 
                                                 
31
 C. E. Bosworth, “Mirror for Princes”, in The Routledge Encyclopedia of Arabic Literature,  (eds) J. 
S. Meisami and P. Starkey (London and New York, 1998, reprint  2010), p. 528. 
32
 C. H. de Fouchécour (1986) pp. 418-420 (my translation, using the “KD” abbreviation). 
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the chapter, the next step is the analysis of expressions of morality within the text. 
Should they play a significant role within the chapter’s action, this might effect the 
partial salvation of the traditional viewpoint attributing a role to morality in Dimna’s 
Trial.   
 
As stated above, this study will not engage with the illustrative hikāyats or exempla 
whether with the three already present in the older version by the Munshī, or the 
seven added by Kāshifī.33 They are ambiguous at best and, although they deserve a 
separate study, it is fair to be content here to voice the general conclusion, as does 
Forster in her study of the chapter in the Arabic version, that KD’s exempla propagate 
scepticism rather than morality.
34
  
 
Interestingly, we are also disappointed in our search for moral statements within the 
dialogues between the central character and his respondent, Kalīla, who is often 
considered the virtuous answer to Dimna’s roguishness. Close reading of Kalīla’s 
pontificating admonitions in this chapter shows how the wisdom that enables him to 
predict negative long-term results in fact advocates passivity, rather than expressing 
moral aims. This is coupled to concern for his personal social position and shapes 
Kalīla as a complex and ruthless figure.35 This is especially evident when he chooses 
to sever their ties of friendship in the hope of not sharing Dimna’s downfall and also, 
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 These are in Kāshifī’s version: (1) the fox who desired to get possession of the fowl and lost the 
piece of skin; (2) the ass who sought a tail and lost his ears; (3) the equerry who told the king’s secret 
and lost his head for it; (4) the solitary devotee; (5) the blind man who mistook a snake for the thong of 
a whip and fell into the whirlpool of destruction; (6) the saint of radiant mind; (7) the hasty woman 
who did not discriminate between her artist friend and his slave – also in Munshī; (8) the three envious 
persons; (9) the physician who was destitute of science and experience – also in Munshī; (10) the 
falconer giving evidence in a matter with which he was not acquainted – also in Munshī. See the 
discussion by Forster (2009) of the last three stories, which she identifies as exempla in their form and 
their function, in the Arabic and the Hebrew versions and in the German one by Anton von Pforr. 
34
 Forster (2009), also Richter (1968), p. 27 and Obermaier (2004), p. 191. As do other studies of the 
chapter, Forster (2009), describing Dimna as a bad character, adopts the traditional moral value 
judgment which I would like to evacuate from our reading. 
35
 Obermaier (2004), pp. 192-194, in her analysis of Kalīla’s (Kellila) character in von Pforr’s work has 
also pointed to Kalīla’s specious moral sense: his words express an explicit punishment and 
condemnation of Dimna, though she interprets his actions as showing sympathy for Dimna. 
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this hope being frustrated, in his final solution to escape torture and the betrayal of his 
friend’s secrets.  
 
The ethical dimension of a fable can be expressed in the form of a promythium, an 
introduction stating the application of the fable, and of an epimythium, a concluding 
explanation or repetition of what is presented as the one and only way to understand 
the fable. Both channel the reader’s understanding of complex fables into a single 
direction, not allowing the fable “to speak its own language directly to the reader, 
which was its whole vocation”.36 Blackham’s deprecation of the reduction in the 
fable’s scope resulting from these stated moral lessons is nowhere more apposite than 
when applied to the KD collection: the contents fundamentally resist the imposition of 
a moral point to which their multidimensionality cannot be reduced. The result is 
mismatched cacophony.  
 
In Kāshifī’s version, the chapter heading serves as promythium and announces the 
“punishment and disastrous end of evil-doers”.37 I hesitate to file this world-view as 
morality, or even as Lebenklugheit (wordly wisdom and shrewdness), one of 
Wienert’s Sinntypen.38 It is repeated in verse-form in the epimythium and, from a 
political point of view, seems hardly worth our while. Its evident religious flavour is 
further confirmed by a Qur’anic citation about the punishment of the people who act 
wickedly (which will be further discussed below) which precedes the Persian finale:  
 
دشاب نينچ نارادغ راک ماجنا و نيا ناگدننک رکم تبقاع هک 
یونثم 
داتفا مادب شدوخ مه تبقاع داهن ماد قلخ هار رد هک ره 
راخ دراک هک یسک دنيچن لگ راب درآ تداعس یکين خاش 
                                                 
36
  R. Blackham, The Fable as Literature (London and Dover, 1985), pp. 8 and 11. These designations 
are taken from the tradition of Aesopic fables. 
37
 AS ed. p. 167, tr. p. 189: Chapter II: On the Punishment of Evil-Doers and their Disastrous End; 
 تفاي ازس ردناشيا تبقاع تماتش و ناراکدب ن . The Arabic versions and that of Nasrullah Munshī have no title 
that could serve as promythium.  
38
 W. Wienert, Die Typen der griechisch-romanischen Fabel, Folklore Fellows communications, 56, 
(Helsinki, 1925), as mentioned in B. E. Perry, Babrius and Phaedrius (Cambridge, Mass., 1985), pp. 
xxi-xxii. 
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رتهب یئوکين هک نک یئوکين ررض و عفن یازج دش نيقي نوچ 
 
such is the end of deceivers and the termination of traitors: 
Masnavī 
Whoever places in man’s path a snare, Himself will, in the sequel, stumble 
there. 
Joy’s fruit upon the branch of kindness grows, Who sows the bramble will not 
pluck the rose. 
Since loss or gain are to our acts assigned, Do good, for ‘tis far better good to 
find.
39
 
 
I have respected Eastwick’s translation which is successful at rendering the 
inconsequentiality of these versified truisms. They create a jarring effect because in 
fact, the story does not achieve a feel-good ending and the drama just enacted would 
benefit from a tragic Wagnerian combustion in place of this ditty. Also, the message it 
carries, the inevitable retribution of bad actions, though religiously relevant, is useless 
from a practical and political point of view. The chapter has been at pains to show that 
the rogue’s hoped for punishment is the result of several unforgiving actors’ dogged 
exertions, whose morality in turn is by no means above suspicion and who only reach 
their goal thanks to a fortuitous concatenation of serendipitous (un)luck. This 
expressed conclusion is an act of faith, with an, at most tenuous, relation to the 
chapter’s end. It cannot be considered as a logical and unavoidable result of the 
characters’ actions. Neither can it be considered a summing-up of the drama enacted, 
because it nullifies the chapter’s practical demonstration. Thus, in my reading of it, 
this concluding paragraph appears, not as a conclusion at all, but as a teasing quip 
capping the merciless tragedy enacted within the chapter and glibly taking the place 
of a conclusion that would spell out the real scope and purport of Dimna’s Trial, 
which remains unsaid.  
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 AS ed. p. 219, tr. p. 248. Nasrullah Munshī’s epimythium is similar, though briefer: “the end of trick 
and the result of rebellion will be such”: دشاب نينچ یغب ماجرف و رکم تبقاع and followed by an Arabic 
sentence asking God to spare one of nasty characters (Nasrullah Munshī (1343), p. 156). This brings 
Vā’iz Kāshifī’s version closer to some of the Arabic versions, which end on the lesson that retribution 
for lies will come in the extent of these lies. Khawam (1983), p. 203; Wolf reprint (1995), p. 116; 
Miquel’s (1980), p. 132 version is more elaborate. 
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But, morality or perhaps rather wisdom, does have a voice in the chapter, expressed in 
many of the verses that decorate the dialogues between the protagonists, irrespective 
of their character. The densely packed bilingual Arabo-Persian prosimetrum in this 
chapter – as indeed in the whole Anvār – deserves a separate study and will be dealt 
with in my forthcoming monograph on the text. The quotations come in two kinds: 
those in Arabic have direct links to religion, such as The service of kings is half the 
road [to heaven] (p. 212)
40
, Love of the world is the head of all sin (p. 208), or The 
retaliation of evil ought to be an evil proportionate thereto (p. 244). Some consist of 
in traditional exclamations, such as: Let us take refuge from it with God (p. 235). 
Others still are quotations whose religious purport is not immediately obvious, though 
they relate to the same sphere, such as: And when the morn breathed forth (p. 211).  
 
These Arabic passages appear to be in conflict with a decision expressed by the author 
in his preface: the pledge to purge the text of difficult Arabic words and expressions 
used by his predecessor. If Kāshifī has not done away with Arabic completely, he has 
reduced the quotations to a minimum: they are brief and appear to the proportion of 
roughly one to six with the Persian verse quotations which, as we shall see, might 
count up to five or six bayts. Their immediately obvious didactical use is to propose 
the essential smattering of Arabic sententiae that is part of a robust Muslim religious 
and literary education. But beyond their use in familiarising the audience with citing 
the important body of Qur’anic moral concepts, I detect a provocative use of the 
iqtibās41 and of the poetical citations I further discuss below. Disharmony with the 
context in which they are embedded is so recurrent, that beyond the immediate 
humorous effect, I am even tempted to decode a system at work: a disingenuous 
rhetorical perversion of the phenomenon which has been identified by Stephan Dähne 
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 The page indications are taken from Eastwick’s translation. 
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 G. Van Gelder has coined the “frivolous iqtibas”. The existence of such puns on the Qur’anic text 
opens up the possibility for other similarly irreverent uses such as those I identify in the AS: G. Van 
Gelder, “Forbidden Firebrands: Frivolous “Iqtibās” (quotation from the Qur’an) according to Medieval 
Arab Critics”, Quaderni di Studi Arabi, vol 20-21 (2002-2003), pp. 3-16. See also J. van Ess, 
“Disputationspraxis in der islamischen Theologie » Revue des Etudes Islamiques, XLIV (1976), pp. 23-
60; H. Daiber, “Masā’ l wa-adjwiba”, Encyclopaedia of Islam and M. Cook, “The Origins of Kalam”, 
Bulletin for the School of Oriental and African Studies 43 (1980), pp. 32-43. 
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as “Equivalence of Contexts”. Examining how Qur’anic references within political 
speeches impact on the audience’s subconscious, Dähne considers this as a “cunning 
play with associations as part of a persuasive strategy”. He concludes that this is  
a rhetorical device comparable to other rhetorical figures in so far as it serves 
to embellish and to emphasise the message connected with it. Qur’anic 
vocabulary in political speeches was generally applied for aesthetic reasons 
and in order to sacralise the speech. As a consequence it strengthened the 
orator's own position and protected him against possible disapproval. 
Moreover, the special effect of the deliberate ‘equivalence of contexts’ was 
emotional in nature […]. The creation of such associations may have inclined 
the gathering to accept the substance of the speech, since they could not fail to 
recognise the allusions being made. Moreover, they would more or less be 
able to anticipate the substance of the speech, interwoven as it was both 
linguistically and contextually with the Qur’anic quotation […]”.42 
 
The use of references to a text instilled in the audience’s minds through memorisation, 
reverberates and guarantees a reaction of respect and acceptance of the context in 
which the reference is embedded. In the AS text, this technique plays a meaningful 
psychological role as an instrument of what I identify as a particular brand of 
disingenuous rhetorical manipulation. This latter is at the work’s pedagogical core: 
the apparent iqtibās’s and poetical citations’ role is to validate the logical 
argumentation of those who utter them, with the stamp of religion or received wisdom 
expressed in verse (as was exemplified above with the verses closing the chapter), and 
thus place them beyond critical examination. This artificial layer renders the 
arguments they conclude irrefutable, irrespective of the speaker’s character and of the 
purport of the demonstration. In yet a further step away from their legitimate use, 
Kāshifī’s text shows derisive denunciation of this technique by the trivialisation of the 
figure as shown in the following example: As the Queen Mother pleads with the 
Leopard to help condemn Dimna, she mentions the King’s earlier kindness to the 
Leopard. She pledges that further help now will result in further favour; the Qur’anic 
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 S. Dähne, “Qur’anic Wording in Political Speeches in Classical Arabic Literature,” Journal of 
Qur’anic Studies, 3/2, (2001), pp. 1-13, here pp. 9 and 11. This analysis partakes of the wider 
Reception Theory. 
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quotation provokingly equates the royal benevolence (‘ātifat-i shāh) for the Leopard, 
with divine reward. 
 
 هدعوب ات تسبجاو وت رب یراذگ رکش ار وا تمعن قحمکن ديزلا مترکش نئل ب زور تدايز هاش تفطاع زور
دوش 
It is incumbent on thee to show thy gratitude in order that, according to the 
promise ‘If ye be thankful, I will surely increase my favours towards you’ – 
the favour of the king may be duly enlarged.
43
  
 
The KD has traditionally enjoyed a risqué reputation in theological debates around the 
faculty of speech given to animals, though the Qur’an does mention the ant, hoopoe 
and camel as endowed with speech. Nasrullah Munshī already audaciously notches up 
this heretical flirtation by putting Qur’anic quotations in the mouth of the animals. I 
suggest here that this is further exacerbated by Kāshifī with this characteristic 
frivolous, or disrespectful, rhetorical use of said Qur’anic quotations.44 The above 
hypothesis however, creates a tension with his character as a vā’iz (preacher), which I 
am unable to solve. A further argument contra, is that Kāshifī himself does not hint at 
such use of iqtibās in his prefatory remarks: 
 
 ثيداحا و تايآ یضعب دارياب هيبرع تاملک سانجا زا تاياکح یانثا ردضیرور  هروهشم لاثما و راثآ و رکذلا
 و ددرگ یمن یبرع تايبا تابثا ضرعتم هدومن راصتقاج و رز نوچ هک یسراف راعشا رهاوجب ار نخس هدير
 ...ددنب یم رويز دراد عيصرت تفص رهوگ 
… in the midst of the tales [I] have summarised various sorts of Arabic 
expressions, by introducing certain verses from the Qur’an and sayings of the 
Prophet useful to repeat, and traditions and well-known proverbs; in contrast, 
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 AS, ed p. 217, tr, p. 246. 
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 A. Ghersetti, (2013), p. 23, reflects on the animals as speakers of a very specific form of eloquence 
consisting in proverbs, maxims and wisdom maxims, but she does not mention them specifically as 
quoting the Qur’an. The artificiality of this phenomenon is exacerbated when understood against the 
claim of speech and morality as a human prerogative over animals (C. Atherton, “Children, animals, 
slaves and grammar”, in (eds) Y. L. Too and N. Livingstone (1998), pp. 214-244). The Persian author’s 
identification as a vā’iz undeniably creates a difficulty and might indicate that my hypothesis is an 
instance of “aberrant decoding” (U. Eco, “Towards a Semiotic Inquiry into the Television Message”, 
Working Papers in Cultural Studies (University of Birmingham) 3, pp. 103-121). 
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[I] have not used Arabic verses, but have adorned the page of the narrative 
with the jewels of Persian poetry, which is inlaid like blended gems and 
gold…45 
 
The Persian verses that constellate Kāshifī’s text fulfil a similar role, though they 
come in varied guises kinds, expressing a multiplicity of attitudes. They do not voice 
morality understood as the expression of what is right and what is wrong in the 
actions of a human being. Mostly acting as authenticating verses, they repeat in verse 
form the preceding prose conclusion, which might first be expressed in Arabic. The 
bias towards creating a humorous or ironical disjoint is marked: the situation’s 
earnestness is juxtaposed to the elegant clichéd verses. They might also serve as 
indicators of psychological emotions within those who utter or think them, as found 
here where Kalila resolves to die: 
دش ورف شمد دمآ رب حبص نوچ و ديچيپ یم بش همه داهن تللام رتسب رب تشپ... هليلک 
عرصم 
درب کاخ اب وزرآ نيدنچ و تفر 
  
Kalila… laid himself down on the bed of despondency and writhed through the 
night and as morning rose, his life sank. HEMISTICH: He went, mingling all 
these hopes with dust.
46
 
 
Most quotations voice practical wisdom, rather than any form of moral advice, as in 
the following example, with the quotation taken from the first book of Sa’dī’s 
Gulistān, and proposing a challenging sententia:  
 
نتشاذگ هدنز ب هباثم ناسفن دب اب یئوکين و تسناراک زيه رپ نتشک ربارب ناراکمتسد نايوکين اب ی  
)تيب( 
 هک دبنادرمکين ناجب ندرک  تسنانچ ندرک نادب اب یئوکن 
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 AS, ed. p. 10, tr. p. 12. I have taken muta’ariz (F. Steingass (1944), p. 1162: “opposer, … averse”) as 
an adverb, to mean ‘in contrast’. 
46
 AS, ed. p. 204, tr. p. 230. 
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To leave tyrants alive is the same as killing the just, and to treat evil-disposed 
persons well, is like acting ill to the good. COUPLET: He who benefits on evil 
men confers, upon the good no less heaps injuries.
47
  
 
By Kāshifī’s time, Sa’dī’s aphorisms may well have long been considered as 
proverbial, their pithy formulation and paradoxical contents watered down into 
clichés. As was the case with the iqtibās examined above, their first didactic role is to 
teach the practical and civilised use of sententiae and verses to enliven discourse and 
argumentation. We might also consider that Kāshifī is putting together an influential 
poetical canon. But their presence partakes of the same rhetorical psychological 
manipulation as I have suggested above for the Arabic passages: the technique of 
springing on an audience trite accepted wisdom at the start or close of a demonstration 
is a recognised rhetorical tool, be it a weak one: when occurring in isolated cases, 
these wise truisms argue with only feeble authority.
48
 Rhetoric recognises them as 
restrictive arguments, foreign to rational persuasion, but active on the level of value 
judgment. Kāshifī’s innovation in his rewriting of the KD text is to abuse this 
technique, transforming it in order to create systematic psychological bewilderment. It 
destabilises the audience’s grasp on the argument, seducing it out of the rational 
domain and into agreeing with general truths. 
 
The above hypothesis of a disingenuous rhetorical use of prosimetrum justifies 
sealing off this voice from the action in the story, considering them as two registers 
mutually irreducible to synthesis: thus, the sententia should not intervene in our 
ultimate understanding of the synopsis. They should be kept separate from the fables’ 
action; their function is different and they are only effective as psychological 
rhetorical tools. Furthermore, on the whole, they do not convey a moral dimension 
that can overturn the amoral ambiance of the chapter. 
 
Why then, a sequel to Dimna’s affairs? First, there is the lesson in amoral 
political strategy 
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 AS, ed. p. 204, tr. p. 231. Eastwick identifies the quotations from the first book of Sa’dī’s Gulistān. 
48
 J. J. Robrieux, Rhétorique et Argumentation, 2
nd
 edition (Paris, 2000), pp. 200-201. 
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Kāshifī has given significant importance to Dimna’s Trial in his version, without 
challenging the overall meaning of the action found in other KD versions, but rather 
by expanding it for a more immediate didactic clarity. The exchanges between the 
Lion and his mother in particular, receive especial emphasis. Those between the two 
jackals are also expanded and in their first discussion, rather than expressing moral 
regret at the innocent Bull’s demise, Kalīla states (with a meaningful emphasis on 
malik and mulk) in no uncertain terms that what Dimna has achieved and what will 
cause the problem partakes of a political and royal dimension: 
 
ضقن رب ار کلم و یا هدومن باکترا یمهم ميظع و یا هدرک یراک گرزب هنمد یا  ار کلم و هتشاد دهع
و و عابس نايمرد رد بوشآ و هنتف شتآ و یتخاس بوسنم مامت یتنايخبحیتخورفا رب شو  
O Dimna! you have done a great deed and embarked in a mighty affair, and 
having led the king to a breach of faith, you have caused royalty to be 
associated with utter perfidy and have kindled the flame of mischief and 
disorder among the predators and wild animals. 
49
 
 
Also, when we read at the head start of the chapter the introductory request 
formulated by Dabshalim to the teller of the tale, other elements carry more weight 
than Dimna’s sorry end:  
 
 قح رد هدومن عوجر دوخ لقعب نوچ هثداح نآ عوقو زا دعب ريش هک ديامرف نايب و ديامن زاب هنمد راک تبقاع
دت دش نامگدب هنمدا کسمت تجح هچب هنمد و تفاي فوقو هنوگچ وا ردغ تيفيک رب و دومن عون هچب نآ کر
  ؟ديسر اجکب وا مهم ماجنا رس و تسب لايخ هليح مادکب دوخ صلخم و دومن 
 
Let him explain the termination of Dimna’s career and set forth in what 
manner, after the occurrence of that event [i.e. the murder of the Bull], when 
the Lion had returned to his senses, he became suspicious about Dimna’s 
honesty; in what way he sought to remedy it, how he obtained information of 
the circumstances of his [i.e. Dimna’s] perfidy, and by what demonstration 
Dimna contrived to hold on and finally, what stratagem he himself [i.e. the 
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 AS, ed. p. 173, tr. p. 195 (Eastwick does not differentiate between the two occurrences of 
mulk/malik). 
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Lion/Dimna?] devised, and where he arrived at the issue of this important 
affair.
50
 
 
So, this multi-layered request is anchored within the MfP ambiance: it considers the 
ruler’s embarrassment, who has acted impulsively and violently and now “returns to 
his senses” and views the disaster: 
 
 نآ تلااح نيرتدب ام افتب دناو ار یراکمتس و یئافو یب هعرق و دنا هتخاس تملام ريت فده ارم تيعر هک دو
 تبسن واگب رهاظ یتنايخ ات منکيم واک واک هک نادنچ نم و  دنا هتخادنا نم  مان ربدج و مهر وا رب عقاو یم
مشاب روذعم نارگيد کيدزن وا نتشک رد رگم ات مزاس تباث جوچيهب رود هناگيب نعطو انشآ تعنش زا ويم هس ر
م وق.تسين رود  
 
This is the worst possible situation for us, that the plebs should make me the 
target of the arrow of reproach and cast upon my name the lot of 
unfaithfulness and cruelty. It is in no way feasible or possible, however much I 
strive, to bring home to the Bull a plain case of treason, and to fix a real crime 
on him, in order that I may be absolved by others for slaying him and may 
escape disgrace with those who know me and accusations from strangers.
51
 
 
The catastrophic situation calls for finesse and hard-core political pragmatism. Kāshifī 
paints a depressed Lion missing his former friendly advisor, but reality swiftly shakes 
him out of his private regrets. His hasty use of violence against the Bull, without a 
thorough examination of the case is putting his rule in danger. It is likely that the 
unexpressed subtitle for the enlightened elite readership of the KD fables would spell 
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 AS, ed. p. 123, tr. p. 189. My translation differs from that proposed by Eastwick, in particular in my 
understanding of the unclear تسب لايخ هليح مادکب دوخ صلخم و. Eastwick chose to translate mukhlas as 
“sincere friend,” also proposed in F. Steingass (1944), p. 1197. In this case, the author would give a 
clue to Kalīla’s suicide, as the ‘stratagem’ he devises. Though tempted by this suggestion, I rather take 
mukhlas as adverb meaning ‘finally, to sum up, in short’ and understand the presence of khud as 
referring back to the Lion, though it might also point to Dimna. 
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 AS, ed. p. 175, tr. p. 198. I interpret nazdīk-i digarān as relating to ‘other’ rulers or advisors, as 
opposed to the ra’iyat, the subject, the plebs. 
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the recognition that hasty acts of violence signal weakness.
52
 This is an impression 
which the Lion first needs to erase. The second problem is his failure to appear as 
safeguard guardian of the justice in his realm. Royalty is fragile, it earns its legitimacy 
from the “duty of exhorting to righteousness and forbidding from evil”.53 The ruler 
absolutely needs to pin the guilt for the spell of unnecessary violence on an 
unimportant actor, accusing him of slander and the chapter teaches us how he will act 
in order to “terminate Dimna’s affair”. In order to restore faith in his ability as a 
powerful ruler who upholds justice, there must be a public trial, a semblance of fair 
hearing and an exemplary punishment: Dimna doesn’t stand a chance! 
 
A third overriding incentive for his decision is the necessity to discourage potential 
would-be manipulative advisors. The Queen Mother has been quick to spot this and 
uses it in her initial argumentation for the necessity of punitive action: 
...ددرگ نادسفم رگيد یريلد بجوم دياين ديدپ یماقتنا رگا 
Should no vengeance be taken, it would serve to embolden other incendiaries 
…54  
  
The question of trust in the advisor is of paramount importance for a ruler and it is no 
surprise that the KD examines the topic in a kaleidoscope of related stories.
55
 Dimna’s 
                                                 
52
 This is a recognised signal, as Nizam al-Mulk for example, mentions in the 38
th
 chapter of his 
Siyāsat-Nāma entitled “On the inadvisability of hastiness in affairs on the part of kings”, which 
contains remarks similar to the KD contents: “For hastiness is a mark of weakness, not a sign of 
strength… you should not be precipitate and then suffer remorse and regret, for regret is of no avail”. 
Nizam al-Mulk, The Book of Government or Rules for Kings. The Siyar al-Muluk or Siyasat-Nama, tr. 
by Hubert Darke (1960, reprint Persian Heritage Series, London, Henley and Boston, 1978), p. 129. 
Pellat elaborates on the concept of hilm, the kingly virtue of patience and its history, in his article 
“hilm” in the Encyclopedia of Islam online, (eds) P. Bearman , Th. Bianquis , C. E. Bosworth , E. van 
Donzel and W. P. Heinrichs (2007): http://www.brillonline.nl.proxy.uchicago.edu/subscriber/ 
uid=1378/. 
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 A. K. S. Lambton, “Justice in the Medieval Theory of Kingship”, 93, Studia Islamica 17 (1962), pp. 
91-119. jstor  http://www.jstor.org/stable/1595003, especially pp. 98-99 where she analyses Ibn al-
Muqaffa‘’s interest for and involvement with, the theory of royal justice.  
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 AS, ed. p. 180, tr. p. 203. 
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 Note that the older chapter (Chapter 9 in Kāshifī’s version) dealing with the Pious Jackal and the 
Lion King shows a similar case study reaching the opposite conclusion. Here it is the wise advisor (the 
jackal) who is slandered and punished at first (in a parallel situation as that of the honest Bull slandered 
30 
eventual disproportionate punishment is another indication of the need for a ruler to 
discourage would-be liars or manipulators amongst his advisors. 
 
As they focus on capital aspects of a ruler’s career, these points harmonise with the 
work’s didactic purpose. They are more relevant than attempts at explaining Dimna’s 
downfall as the result of his personifying an intrinsic opposition to a rigid social 
stratification. It is possible to decipher within the Queen Mother’s advice an 
instinctive dislike towards the social climber, the pre-eminent Ciceronian figure of the 
self-made rhetorician, which Dimna represents to perfection. However, I do not agree 
that this aspect can be considered as the chapter’s incentive and purpose.56 
 
We have seen that the action is not articulated around the ultimate victory of morality 
over immorality; it is certainly not illustrating the righteousness of the king’s justice 
either!
57
 The king’s request for a public trial is a political move that will clear the 
stain on his escutcheon. The public dispensation of justice will be for appearance’s 
sake only, a tool for political ends, as the trial’s issue is already decided during his 
first conversation with the Queen Mother: 
 
                                                                                                                                            
by Dimna). The king has the same need to save face and to find a scapegoat. In this case, he will be 
able to accuse the wicked jealous courtiers of slander and punish them, just as severely as is Dimna in 
this chapter. The paramount importance of choosing a trustworthy advisor is mentioned in several 
passages of Nizam al-Mulk’s Mirror. It is also of concern in other cultural milieus, such as that 
described by N. Machiavelli, The Prince, (eds) Q. Skinner and Russell Price (1988, Cambridge,  reprint 
2004), Chapters XXII “The Secretaries of Rulers” and XXIII “How Flatterers should be shunned”, pp. 
80-82. 
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 As does S. Obermaier in her analysis of the chapter, (2004, p. 189). See also L. Marlow (1997, pp. 
76-77), who uses Dimna’s downfall as an indication that KD and Ibn al-Muqaffa‘ ultimately conform 
to a static “Iranian” social view, leading to the punishment of the social climber. The social dimension 
is not the overriding point of the chapter, but it is present in filigree; the distrust expressed at the Lion’s 
court concerns Dimna’s rhetorical proficiency which allows him to manipulate those who listen to him. 
This shapes him as a Ciceronian character, the vir bonus of the Late Republic, who is “a prime example 
of a man self-made through his abilities to exploit his oratorical skills and his command of the 
mechanisms of cultural manipulation, moulding and formulation”. (J. E. Montgomery, “Al-Jāhiz’s 
Kitāb al-Bayān wa al-Tabyīn”, in Writing and Representation in Medieval Islam. Muslim Horizons, 
(ed.) J. Bray (London New York, 2006), p. 97. 
57
 As proposed by C.-H. de Fouchécour (1986), p. 416. 
31 
 
 
 
عطاق صنب و داد ديابن لاجم ار ضامغا و وفع  اجنيا سپ ويح صاصقلا یف مکلوه دتا دياب مزاول زا ارنآ کر
 تخانش 
)تيب( 
یامرف شنتشکب وا تستکلمم یودع  ديامرف قلخ رازآب هک تسک نآ ره 
 
Pardon and neglect must not be allowed here, and in accordance with the 
irrefragable mandate ‘And in this Law of retaliation you have life,’ punishing 
that one must be considered a necessity.  
(COUPLET)  
Whoever bids thee vex thy subject, them – As public enemies to death 
condemn.
58
 
 
A further indication that, independent of whether or not he is guilty, Dimna’s 
condemnation is not negotiable is found in the specious justice engineered by the 
Queen Mother and the King who instruct the judge.
 59
 Based on my rudimentary 
understanding of Hanafi Islamic law (prevalent at the ‘Abbasid court when Ibn al-
Muqaffa‘ presumably composed this chapter),60 I detect several flaws in the conduct 
and in the conclusion of the case: (a) the judge does not give Dimna, as the defendant, 
the favourable presumption which law stipulates, while (b) the onus of proof should 
lie with the plaintiff; in this case, the Queen Mother, who publicly accuses Dimna, but 
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 AS, ed. p. 180, tr. p. 203. The Arabic quotation is identified by Eastwick (reprint 2005, p. 203) as 
Qur’an ii, 175 (or 180). The passage is also a good example of the provocative use of Arabic and 
Persian quotations examined above. 
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 Presumably, Kāshifī’s audience would have been able to detect the flaws of the early ‘Abbasid 
judicial system depicted in Dimna’s condemnation. He does not tamper with the elements present in 
Nasrullah Munshī’s version, which are taken over from the Arabic KD text.  
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 The Hanafi jurists only really became prevalent from the late eighth century, though they probably 
were already favoured by the dynasty prior to al-Mahdī’s reign (r. 775-785): M. Tillier, “Abbasid 
Dynasty”, in The Oxford International Encyclopedia of Legal History, (ed) S. N. Katz (Oxford, 2009), 
I, pp. 1-2.  Also M. Tillier, “Courts”, in The Oxford Encyclopedia of Islam and Politics, (ed.) E. El-Din 
Shahin (New York, 2004), 1, pp. 227-232. 
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cannot adduce any conclusive proof.
61
 The final condemnation rests on the two 
witnesses demanded by law. But, (c) both witnesses have overheard a conversation, 
which they might have misinterpreted and (d) Dimna is not given a chance to explain 
or defend himself against this evidence. More surprisingly, (e) the second of these 
witnesses is a fellow prisoner, thus by no stretch of the imagination what Islamic law 
calls an ‘adl witness. This disregard for the necessary probity of witnesses, stresses 
the partiality of Dimna’s condemnation, though for Islamic judicial procedure, it does 
not invalidate the judge’s decision.62 Thus, Dimna’s condemnation is unjust though 
lawful. It gives especial prominence to one of the chapter’s aims: to show how the 
two lions successfully impose their will on the qādī who is filling his role as “legal 
official under the ruler’s supreme judicial power”63 and how they manipulate the trial, 
in order to deflect the impact of the ruler’s catastrophic mistake in killing the Bull. 
Morality does not intervene. 
 
ب وا تحاصف زا.دندنام بجعت  
 “The attendants of the royal throne were astonished at [Dimna’s] rhetorical 
skills”64 
It is time to turn now to another – perhaps the most arresting because the most 
practically didactical - aspect of the chapter’s purport, expressed in the second 
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element of the introductory request to the story-teller: How will the accused Dimna 
act and what “shifts will he contrive” to escape the noose. This is about a judiciary 
case, and especially, about acquiring the practical rhetorical techniques for the 
accused to defend himself and to construct a successful Apologia. 
 
When Richter above, recognised the centrality of Dimna’s Apologia within the 
chapter, he stumbled on the rogue’s (mis)use of arguments of good faith in order to 
win his case. Though this shows how he missed to core of the chapter’s relevance, his 
view is symptomatic of the prevalent opinion, adopted from Aristotle and Quintillian, 
that the rhetorician ought to be a vir bonus dicendi peritus. It might be more correct to 
understand Aristotle as advising that one “must not” use one’s rhetorical skill to 
persuade people of morally bad things.
65
 Although the audience might view Dimna’s 
Apologia as an illustration of how in this case, practice departs from theory, it is 
arguable that in Dimna’s mind, his defence does not figure amongst morally 
reprehensible topics. Moreover, to continue with Engberg-Pedersen’s discussion of 
Aristotle’s views: “rhetoric is intrinsically morally neutral. It involves specific 
knowledge and the ability to find persuasive arguments on ethical-political issues. It 
does not presuppose any particular moral character or motivation”.66   
 
There is little action within this second chapter, but this is compensated by long 
dialogues between two different groups: at the level of the ruler, we have exchanges 
between the King and his vizier Leopard, a dialogue between the Leopard and the 
Queen Mother and discussions between the Queen Mother and her son. The latter, we 
have seen, consist in ponderings on the best solution to a problem of internal politics. 
The other level is that of Dimna, dialoguing with Kalīla, with Ruzba,67 and at length 
defending himself against his accusers. Once we accept that the lengthy rhetorical 
discussions are no idle digressions, but form a most significant core to the chapter’s 
practical pedagogy, things become meaningful. Dimna’s defence technique lies at the 
heart of the chapter’s homiletic dimension. The trial is an opportunity to illustrate the 
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art of rhetoric, considered of prime importance in courtly education as an 
indispensible intellectual and practical skill to achieve social self-furtherance.
68
  
 
The crime interest in the story of the Lion and the Bull affords not only, as we have 
seen, a perfect introduction to an intricate discussion of how a ruler can tip the scales 
back in his favour, but also to a typical judiciary case exposing detailed rules of 
forensic rhetoric and dialectical reasoning. The first chapter’s characters and plot 
serve as a convenient shortcut for the judicial case. In contrast to the animal courtiers 
in the story who have only been bemused spectators of the Bull’s death and who have 
only their instinctive mistrust of the socially climbing jackal to go upon, we have 
followed Dimna’s and the Lion’s every thought, word and action. We know what 
weighs on their conscience and this gives us insights into the Lion’s semblance of 
judiciary decision-making and into Dimna’s use of forensic rhetoric. (THANKS! 
CvR) 
 
The sequel shows us in practice, how a rhetorical genius who happens to be guilty, 
can hope to extricate himself from the accusations hurled at him. A skilled sophist in a 
desperate corner, Dimna uses all the stops he knows to disentangle himself. We learn 
with him how rhetoric codifies the arguments, captivates the audience, nullifies the 
opponent’s attacks, wins interest and goodwill and finally carries conviction. The 
courtiers at the close of the first sparring match note his proficient fasāhat with awe.69 
Ibn al-Muqaffa‘ pitches the difficulties for Dimna. He is placed in the most delicate of 
all rhetorical corners: he is defending himself, and his is a causa turpis. He has only 
the help of rhetoric to defend this foul cause, in the face of an inimical audience, 
whose distrust is activated by his very proficiency at rhetoric! He is guilty of what he 
is accused of and he stands on a very sticky wicket because, in order to deflect the 
accusations, he should point at the actual murderer who unfortunately, happens to be 
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the King, the ultimate decision-maker in this judiciary case. All these could seriously 
handicap Dimna as orator for the defence, but he rises magnificently to the challenge. 
More than an entertaining piece of judicial theatre, Dimna’s sensational defence is 
foremost, in the line of the work’s educational purpose, a practical demonstration 
laying out the gamut of rules of rhetorical address and dialectics. This is what 
produces a high interest pitch across cultures and throughout centuries and I identify 
this aspect as the most likely lever behind Ibn al-Muqaffa‘’s decision to compose a 
sequel.
70
 
 
Dimna’s Apologia is illustrating rhetorical techniques which revolve around logic and 
syllogism. It would be tedious to detail all the points of forensic rhetoric which are put 
into practice, but it would also be a pity not to briefly highlight two particularly 
interesting moments in the trial: Dimna’s rhetorical responses to the Queen Mother’s 
introductory surprise accusation and his philosophical evacuation of the 
physiognomic argument.  
 
Dimna as a vir bonus 
The inception of Dimna’s Apologia shows an awareness of the practical rules erected 
into a rhetorical theory by Aristotle.
71
 An orator first needs to establish the rhetorical 
proof of ethos: his character must encourage the audience to consider him credible. 
The confidence inspired by the orator’s character should derive from the discourse, 
not from a prior impression on his character.
72
 The fact that the audience has a 
negative a-priori towards Dimna is a serious difficulty but is not absolutely relevant; 
they must be made to trust him through his discourse. Next, the orator must focus on 
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pathos, altering the audience’s judgment by emotional appeals, and finally, the logos, 
his inductive or deductive reasoning, will construct his argument. 
 
The Queen Mother’s attack is conceived to destabilise Dimna, presenting the case as 
closed, listing accusations as already established. She also cunningly avoids telling 
Dimna how exactly his slander, and how much of it, has become evident.  
 
 وت هنتف و داسف و  مولعم وت تنايخ نوچ و تسا هتخاس رکفتم وت یناگدنز ار کلمظ رد هکيغورد و تشگ رها
ط اب یتفگ وا نابرهم تسود قحر ار وت هک دياشن دش عفترم وت یاهرکم و اه تلايح یور زا هدرپ و داتفا ح
دنراذگ هدنز نيعلا هتفرط 
It is your life on which the king deliberates, and since your treason has 
become known and the villainy of your harmful act manifest, and the 
falsehood which you uttered in relation to his beloved friend, is patent, and the 
veil has been removed from the face of your machinations and artifices, it is 
not fit that you should be left alive one minute longer …73 
 
Instead of adducing plodding refutations to these vague generalised accusations, 
searching for elusive proofs of his own good character, and denying his slanderous 
actions, Dimna deflects the accusation swiftly, with triple-barrelled efficiency, by 
shifting attention to the dangers of serving a ruler, thus exposing oneself to courtiers’ 
jealousy and to a king’s proverbial lack of gratefulness towards those who serve him 
well. This implies the slick sophism of using the fact that he is accused, as the very 
proof of his character’s innocence, which successfully establishes his ethos! It also 
serves as pathos, enlisting the audience’s sympathy with his fate. And it puts the 
Accusation in the difficult position of having to prove that they base themselves on 
facts that are not generated by ruthless royal ingratitude or jealous courtiers’ slander. 
Dimna is also aware that no such proofs of his guilt exist, with the exception, as we 
saw above, of Kalila’s eventual confession, should he be called as a witness. 
 
Translated into the syllogistic formula, Dimna’s response becomes: 
1. Corrupt courtiers are jealous of honest advisors, friends of the king envy the 
advisors’ exalted position and kings are ungrateful 
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2. I am accused either by the courtiers or by the king 
Thus, I am the victim of jealousy or ungratefulness and thus innocent. 
 
The first issue within this syllogism lies in the major premise, which proposes 
particular cases as universal truths. These generalisations (corrupt courtiers, jealous 
courtiers, honest advisors, ungrateful kings) might or might not be applicable to the 
case at hand. They form a petitio principii and cannot serve as majors in a 
syllogism.
74
 The second fallacy lies in the final conclusion. That Dimna should be 
victim of ungratefulness does not immediately result in proving his innocence. The 
falseness is hidden because of the renown of the universal truism expressed in the 
major, the false part is assented to and accepted just as the true part.
75 
 
 
However, the pause which would allow the audience to reflect and spot the syllogistic 
problems is not granted them as Dimna immediately enlarges upon the truism 
expressing the danger of service to the rulers. The efficacy of this technique consists 
in firstly embarrassing the king who is indeed guilty of this particular kind of 
ungratefulness towards the Bull who had served him well. It is also useful as it 
deflects the attention away from Dimna, the court now feeling that the accusation ad 
hominem against the king first needs to be redressed before returning to Dimna’s case. 
 
 
Firāsat - Physiognomy 
Poirot rose. “If you will forgive me for  
being personal – I do not like your  
face, Mr Ratchett.”
76
 
 
During the second day, after a brilliant demonstration by Dimna on the dangers of 
speaking without sufficient conclusive evidence, a member of the audience 
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circumvents this by calling upon a scientific negative evaluation of Dimna’s nature 
based on the decoding of his facial characteristics: 
 
ددرگ تسرد وت لکيه و تأيه و لکش زا مه وت لاح یجک 
[O Dimna!], the perverseness of your disposition accords with your shape and 
form and appearance.
 77
 
  
The principles of physiognomy – the assessment of a person’s character or personality 
from his outer appearance, especially the face - are attributed to Aristotle (Kitāb fi al-
firāsa and also the spurious Kitāb Sirr al-asrār, both translated into Arabic in the 
ninth century) and were further developed by Polemon of Laodicea (d. c. AD 144), 
who was held in Arabic sources as the highest authority on physiognomy (aflīmūn 
sahib al-firāsa).78 Far from being sneered at, the theory was very seriously examined 
on two fronts: the topic was of interest to Muslim philosophers, such as Fakhr al-Dīn 
Rāzī who wrote a philosophico-medical treatise on firāsat.79 Jurists further engaged 
with the idea that the scientific findings of physiognomy could be used as legal 
evidence in judiciary cases. Some proposed to add firāsat to the three traditional 
proofs (confession, testimony and the defendant’s refusal to take an oath to affirm his 
denial of the plaintiff’s claims) that could serve as basis for a valid judgment.80 
 
Remarkably, the desperate Accusation recourses to precisely such a physiognomic 
argument as evidence against Dimna: 
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مياد یجلاتخا و دشاب رتدروخ پچ مشچ زا وا تسار مشچ هک وربا هداشگ ره هک دنا هدروآ راعش تسارف یاملع 
 عمجتسم شکرابمان تاذ داتفا نيمز یور رب هتسويپ وا رظن و دراد ليم پچ بناجب وا ینيب و دوب بلاغ وا رب
تسا دوجوم وا رد تاملاع نيا و  دوب دهاوخ ردغ و روجف عمجم و رکم و داسف 
  
Sages skilled in physiognomy have pronounced that every one with wide 
eyebrows, whose right eye is smaller than his left, and who is subject to a 
perpetual throbbing of the eye, and whose nose inclines to the left and whose 
glance is ever cast down to the ground, his ill-omened nature will be filled 
with mischief and deceit and be replete with profligacy and perfidiousness. 
And these signs are to be found in him!
81
 
 
Physiognomy was also related to sophistry but in our case, it is the sophist himself 
who has to refute the relevance of the physiognomic argument. Dimna’s refutation 
highlights the philosophical weaknesses of the theory: God could not make a mistake 
when placing the signs of an ill-nature on someone’s face. This implies the divine pre-
ordination of every creature’s nature, which was a passionately disputed consequence 
of the theory.
82
 Dimna then unfurls a further level of startling consequences: character 
being stamped on each face, justice would need neither oaths and proofs, nor 
pleadings and citations before a court. Evidently referring to - and negating - the 
classical anecdote of Polemon and Hippocrates,
83
 Dimna again uses syllogism and 
fallacy: it would not be well to praise anyone for his good actions or reproach him for 
ill-actions, since no created being could free himself of the marks of his nature which 
accompany him throughout his life. Thus, the punishment of the bad and the reward 
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of the good would cease to exist in law and justice. This is a fallacious argument, as 
he collates pre-ordained nature with the need to punish bad actions. The idea thus 
emerges that this would be tantamount to criticising God’s decision to create some 
characters evil-natured and bad-looking. His demonstration then proceeds with a 
daring paradox: had he done the bad things he is accused of, it would be because of 
the marks wished on him by God. Since it is impossible to get rid of them, it would be 
wrong to punish him: 
 
 هدوبن ناکما زيح رد نآ عفد نوچن متسرلاب دنب زا وت لوقب نم سپ ... مدرگ ذوخأم نآ تبوقعب هک دياش  
And as repulsing these [bad actions] is not within the scope of what is 
possible, I should not be arrested in order to be punished for those things I 
have done… Thus, by your sentence, I am set free of the bonds of the trial. 84 
 
Dimna grants himself the pleasure of rounding off with a triumphant argument ad 
personam, disqualifying his opponent on the grounds inter alia of his own 
physiognomic argument which has just been ridiculed:  
یدرک رهاظ دوخ ديلقت و لهج ناهرب وت و  یلوق و غورفيب یيوعد و لصا یب یشيامن و مولعمان یا هملکب و
یدومن هجومان یلخدم لضافا سلجم رد عومسمان 
you have made a show of your own silliness and buffoonery; by this 
unremarkable speech, ignoble appearance, unconvincing accusation, and 
inadmissible affirmations, you have shown yourself unfit to access the 
assembly of the virtuous men.
85
 
 
The implication of this last remark is powerful: Dimna’s triumph in disqualifying and 
ridiculing the speaker who was using the powerful physiognomic argument, shows 
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him to be equal to any further accusation one might adduce against him. The audience 
is at a loss to find stronger arguments and falls speechless by fear of ridicule:
86
  
 
 داد باوج هنوگنيدب هنمد نوچج تسراين مد یسک نآ زا شيب و دنداهن نخس جرد رب توکس رهم نارضاح هلم
دز 
When Dimna had delivered this reply, all those who were present placed the 
seal of silence on the casket of speech, and none uttered a further sigh.
87
 
 
 
The conundrum of tasdīq 
The silence of the court is considered as expressing assent, though we see that it is the 
direct result, not of their conviction that Dimna is innocent, but of his overwhelming 
proficiency in rhetoric. This constitutes good theatre, and an encouragement for every 
reader of KD to acquire similar rhetorical techniques by diligent study of the chapter’s 
dialectics. More challengingly, Dimna’s silencing the audience is also the expression 
of an intricate philosophical conundrum, which gives the chapter in this Persian 
version all its worth and interest.
88
 
 
Dimna has established himself as an exceptionally skilled rhetorician, with a twist, as 
he is not conjugating his rhetorical excellence with ethical ideology. The chapter’s 
author has chosen to illustrate here the philosophical consequences that underlie the 
rhetorical prowess of a reprehensible character. He reacts upon the classical idea, as 
expressed by Plato’s contemporary Isocrates, and famously argued by Aristotle, that 
mastery in rhetoric ought to go hand in hand with unimpeachable ethos. Ars rhetorica 
should also constitute an ethical pedagogy, as the trustworthiness of the proofs 
furnished to argue a case depends on the speaker’s morality. But oratory has allowed 
Dimna (transcending his identity as an animal actor in a fable and acting as the 
paradigm for the orator) to surpass his fellows “in what first and foremost makes men, 
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as a group, surpass animals – language – and has raised men from the level of 
primitive society to ‘this human culture and polity’; since he excels at what makes 
humans superior to beasts, the successful speaker, we may infer, is ipso facto, a 
successful human being”.89  
 
Dimna’s Apologia is a sensational counter-example of the two generally accepted 
ideas related to the use of rhetorical skills. As we have seen, Dimna represents an 
unscrupulous person who negates the requirement that the accomplished orator be a 
morally good man. His case also illustrates how the power of rhetorical skills is in fact 
divorced from ethical codes of conduct and may successfully be wielded even in 
defence of a morally questionable case. The chapter teaches us that an accomplished 
orator aims to find the best means of persuasion, irrespective of the moral quality of 
the belief he is trying to generate in his audience.
90
 The Persian rewriters have chosen 
to take the consequences one step further, provocatively stressing that an assembly 
may indeed be swayed by the power of rhetoric independently of the speaker’s 
personality and aims: it may thus agree on something that is not just. The 
philosophical interest of the Persian versions of Dimna’s Apologia nestles in this 
exposition of the interface between rhetoric and ethics and appears to challenge the 
famous Hadith of Muhammad, “My community will never agree upon on error”. 
 
The fundamental concept of Arabic commentaries on the Rhetoric is that of 
“persuasion” or “conviction.” Doxa is the goal towards which rhetorical 
argumentation is aimed, rather than towards the cognitive act, episteme.
91
 This 
doxastic assent by the audience depends upon a judgment, which will accept what the 
rhetorician has put forward. In the present case, the tasdīq (assent), is not about the 
objective truth, but about accepting that no arguments can stand against Dimna’s 
rhetorical skill. It is characteristic that Dimna’s defence consists in rhetorical 
refutations, he nowhere adduces any material or epistemic proof arguing his honesty 
against the accusation of slander. 
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The audience’s state induced by Dimna’s rhetorical arguments indicates a lasting 
tasdīq. At the opening of the proceedings of the next and last day, the qāzī requests 
evidence against Dimna. Again, no one utters a word and not a particle of information 
is adduced with reference to him, either good or ill. Recognising this and attempting 
to deny that the audience is thus expressing assent of Dimna’s rhetorical proofs, the 
principal judge, who has received the royal order to convict Dimna, addresses him in 
terms that suggest the incapacity for any accusation to hold its own against Dimna’s 
proficient rhetorical skills. However, this also sounds suspiciously like manipulation 
by the judge, as we have nowhere been given evidence that this is the feeling of the 
assembly:  
 
 اروت نارضاح هچ رگایشوماخب یراي  لد اما دنهديمنانگمه  وت کلاه رب هلمج و تسا هتفرگ رارق وت تنايخب
...دنا قفتم 
Though the audience befriends you by its silence, yet the hearts of all are 
unanimously convinced of your treason and inwardly agree as to your 
annihilation.
92  
 
Dimna has triumphed rhetorically as he has reached a point when, through his 
rhetorical arguments, he has managed to silence any further accusation, and thus to all 
appearances, to carry the tasdīq of the audience. This is the ultimate result any 
rhetorician who is defending his causa turpis hopes to reach. The judge now can only 
resort to two solutions in order to pronounce a legal condemnation: either he extorts a 
confession, forcing Dimna to take an oath towards the untruth of the facts he is 
accused of (this, the judge will indeed suggest, only to be rejected by Dimna with a 
typical “dumbfounding retort” or al-ajwiba al-muskita),93 or he finds proof from 
“outside the art of rhetoric”, from independent and reliable witnesses for the 
prosecution. The latter solution will occur, as we know, though at this moment, 
Dimna is unaware of the existence of these two witnesses and is convinced he has 
now won his case. 
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* 
*     * 
 
Ibn al-Muqaffa‘’s decision to add within the tight fabric of the KD fables a chapter 
enacting a brilliant apology is in harmony with the book’s pre-eminent usefulness as a 
MfP. It is also reflecting what must have been the intelligentsia buzz of the moment: 
the introduction of classical research on rhetoric and dialectics, with their 
philosophical connotations which irrigated the world of the late ‘Umayyad and early 
‘Abbasid thinkers, with long-lasting effect. The accepted date of the oldest Arabic 
translation of Aristotle’s Rhetoric (731 AD) is roughly contemporaneous with Ibn al-
Muqaffa‘’s translation of the KD.94 We have also seen that an element such as 
physiognomy was introduced and examined concurrently. It is thus not such a long 
shot to envisage Ibn al-Muqaffa‘ as steeped in a society overwhelmed by the 
philosophical and theological implications of the discovery of these challenging texts 
and as an active participant in the burgeoning debates they triggered.
95
 The author did 
not rest content with a brilliant illustration of practical rhetoric but shows critical 
engagement with some of the tenets of the classical theories, such as the idea that 
acquiring reason is related to acquiring virtuous habit. He saw the potential usefulness 
of these interrogations for a ruler and how a chapter dedicated to the multiplicity of 
their practical and theoretical usages for courtiers and rulers alike, could fill a gap 
within the KD’s teachings.  
 
I have thus decoded this aspect within the chapter’s multiple functions, as a 
pedagogical case study setting out in exemplary fashion the forensic rhetorical 
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 Ibn al-Nadīm (1970, pp. 601-602) mentions several old and more recent translations of the Rītūrīqā. 
The Greek and Arabic philosophers have debated the inclusion of Rhetoric, the art of building an 
argument in accusation or in defence, as a branch of Logic. Although we tend to consider Aristotle’s 
Rhetoric and Poetics as texts of interest to literary studies, they were developed as primarily 
philosophical theories whose aims are in many ways radically divergent from literary ones (Black 
(1990), p. 5). Rhetoric encompasses the analysis of how syllogisms work and the means of discovering 
dialectical proofs, the examination of errors in proofs and of omissions and mistakes committed in 
reasoning. 
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techniques inherited from Classical Antiquity and their inferences for philosophical 
reasoning.  
 
Remarkably, this latter dimension which examines the deeper level of consequences 
underlying rhetorical proficiency, and is not, or no longer, stated expressis verbis in 
the extant versions of the Arabic Ibn al-Muqaffa‘ text, is clarified and emphasised in 
Persian versions, where the philosophical strain posited by the audience’s tasdīq is 
recognised. May we consider this as an innovation introduced in the twelfth-century 
Persian version and symptomatic of the cultural ambiance at the Ghaznavid court and 
carried across to the late Timurid period?
96
 This is a complicated problem which begs 
further scrupulous examination beyond the scope of the present essay. Kāshifī shows 
elsewhere in the work enough freedom in his rewriting choices for us to draw 
attention to the fact that, though a renowned theologian and scholar, he was 
presumably happy to take over his predecessor’s statement of this conundrum 
designed to challenge the notion of tasdīq.  
   
The fascination for the examination of the Rhetoric played on multiple levels: as part 
of the Science of Society, several of its aspects could be harmoniously integrated 
within the KD fables.
97
 This siyāsat-i mudun is highlighted by Kāshifī as one of the 
ways in which to understand his polysemous Anvār: 
 
 حلاصم نتسناد زا تسترابع یلمع تمکح و تسا یلمع تمکح رب هنمد و هليلک باتک ساسا هک تسناد ديابب
را تکرح هکنآ یکي :هدش مسفنم مسق ودب یلوا ميسقت رد تمکح زا مسق نيا و ...یناسنا عون یعيبط لاعفا و یدا
 ليبس رب یهورگ اب عجار هکنآ مود و دارفنلاا یلع یسفن ره اب دشاب عجارم ره اب وا عوجر هک ار لوا .تکراش
خا بيذهت دشابن روصتم باب نآ رد یو اب رگيد تکرش و دوب دارفناب یسفن اب تسا عجار هک یناث و دنيوگ قلا
                                                 
96
 The silence of the audience is not mentioned in Ibn al-Muqaffa‘, according to the three translations 
of the Arabic text which I used (A. Miquel (1980), R. Khawam (1985) and P. Wolff (reprint 1995)). It 
has either been erased from Arabic versions, or is introduced by Nasrullah Munshī. It is present in his 
version in terms which have been taken over almost verbatim by Kāshifī (Munshi, (1343), p. 150). It is 
not present in the contemporary Persian version by Bukhārī, which is closer to the Arabic ones. 
(Bukhārī, Dāstān-i Bīdpay, P. Nātīl-Khānlārī (ed.), Khuārazmī, Tehrān, 1361, p. 151) 
97
 Al-Farabi, Cataloguo de las ciencias, edited and translated A. Gonzales Palencia (Madrid, 1953), 
cited in S.H. Nasr, Science and Civilisation in Islam, 2
nd
 edition (Cambridge, 1987), pp. 61-63. 
46 
 تکلمم و ميلقا رد هکلب تيلاو و رهش رد تکراشم هکنآ یکي دريذپيم ماسقنا مسق ودب زاب تکراشم اب یتعامج
هروکذم هصلص ماسقا زا تسا لمتشم روکذم باتک و دنيوگ ندم تسايس ارنآ و دوب 
 
And [the reader] must know that the basis of the book Kalila and Dimna rests 
on practical wisdom, and practical wisdom is explained by the knowledge of 
the actions of the will and the practices natural to the human race… this kind 
of wisdom is first of all divided into two kinds, the one, that which may be 
referred to each person individually; the second, that which relates to a body 
of men viewed in association. The former of these, which is referable to each 
person individually, and in which the society of another is not supposable, 
they call ‘refinement of morals;’ and the other, which has reference to a 
collective body, admits a second two-fold division, the one, partnership in 
abode and habitation, which they call domestic economy; and the other 
community in city and country, and moreover in clime and realm, which is 
named civic economy [i.e. science of society] , and the said book comprehends 
the three kinds that have just been mentioned.
98
 
 
And we have seen above that Kāshifī continues the passage with the remark that the 
refinement of morals (tahzib-i akhlāq) does not hold the focus of the work, though it 
is present in it. The synopsis of Dimna’s Trial does not carry moral lessons or a moral 
finality, while moral essence is alluded to, as argued above, in the illustration of its 
philosophical interface with rhetoric which is the practical consequence of Dimna’s 
rhetorical proficiency.  
 
Wisdom truisms are present on the level of the prosimetrum, whether in Arabic or in 
Persian, but I have hypothesised that these quotations partake of another voice, the 
function of which is constitutive of the rhetorical and psychological system that uses 
truisms in the conclusions of an argument in order to carry the approbation of the 
audience, irrespective of the contents of the sophisticated and specious arguments 
used by the characters. 
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The chapter of Dimna’s Trial is particularly obdurate to morality and it is thus 
remarkable that it has gone down as having been composed with the precise purpose 
of reintroducing morality within the fables! Elucidating the political and rhetorical 
dimension of the chapter is straightforward when following the ingenious authorial 
indications. There is no need to uncork any particular verbal impenetrability or 
esotericism, no need to salvage and restore the author’s hidden intention in a 
Straussian manner.
99
 On the contrary, this is a case of refusing to “read between the 
lines,” of taking the text at face value and of putting aside the traditional view which 
can only at best, conclude to its clumsiness, thus exposing an on-going fundamental 
misunderstanding of the work’s scope and worth.  
 
The characters’ decisions and actions within Dimna’s Trial also annihilate the 
received idea that it illustrates the moral of the prince, as advocated in mirrors, putting 
the virtue of justice at its centre. The chapter also starkly highlights the political 
dimension of law cases, which is divorced from an ideal philosophical law related to 
moral virtue and ethical education. It is as it were a ‘negative’ investigation into the 
relational triangle obtaining between law, rule and virtue.  
 
The fable is jarring because it exposes the limited scope for freedom and morality 
versus overriding political factors to which a ruler is subjected. It also proposes the 
acquisition of reason sealed off from any contemplation of virtue, whether this relates 
to the short-sighted rogue Dimna, the pontificating long-sighted Kalīla, or, especially 
the hasty imprudent King Lion and his wise Queen Mother. Thus, with his decision to 
introduce this chapter within the KD, Ibn al-Muqaffa‘ has respected the fables’ aim of 
illustrating practical aspects and philosophical dimensions of problems related to 
power.  
 
So, to conclude, this is not a chapter about the triumph of morality. It is a chapter 
about a ruler’s inevitable and desperate struggle against powerful and manipulative 
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advisors, illustrating the bitter necessity to achieve the ultimate triumph of political 
rule over the subtleties of rhetorical excellence. Adopting the pun that permeates the 
western Fürstenspiegel tradition, a MfP is about the ‘governance of princes’, about 
both the rule of the monarch and the advisors ruling the monarch’s action!100 
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